University of Mississippi

eGrove
AICPA Annual Reports

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) Historical Collection

1987

Annual report 1986-1987
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. SEC Practice Section. Public Oversight Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_arprts
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons
Recommended Citation
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. SEC Practice Section. Public Oversight Board, "Annual report 1986-1987" (1987).
AICPA Annual Reports. 41.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_arprts/41

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Historical Collection at
eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in AICPA Annual Reports by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact
egrove@olemiss.edu.

ANNUAL

REPORT

P U B L IC

O V E R S I G H T

SEC Practice Section

♦

1986

♦

1987

BOARD

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

Public Oversight Board
A. A. Sommer, Jr., Chairman
Robert K. Mautz, Vice Chairman
Robert F. Froehlke
Melvin R. Laird
Paul W. McCracken
Richard A. Stark, Legal Counsel to the Board

Staff__________________________________________
Louis W. Matusiak, Executive Director and Secretary
Charles J. Evers, Technical Director
John F. Cullen, Assistant Technical Director
Alan H. Feldman, Assistant Technical Director

Office
540 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10022
[212] 486-2448

ANNUAL

REPORT
19861987

PUBLIC
OVERSIGHT
BOARD

SEC Practice Section
A m erican Institute o f C ertified Public A ccountants

Foreword

It is my pleasure and honor, on behalf of the Public Oversight Board, to present this ninth report of
the Board.
In response to questions and criticisms raised in the course of Congressional hearings, but also in
significant measure because of the accounting profession's on-going efforts to maintain and improve the
quality of financial reporting, a number of initiatives were undertaken, both by the profession and by others
during the past year. The Auditing Standards Board published ten proposals for new or revised standards
which, among other things, are intended to narrow the gap between the public's expectations and the profes
sion's standards with respect to the detection of fraud, to involve the auditor to a greater extent in assessing
the adequacy of a client's internal controls, and to increase the responsibility of the auditor with respect to
the assessment of the likelihood of the client's continued existence. The National Commission on Fraudu
lent Financial Reporting (the Treadway Commission) published for public comment a draft report containing
far-reaching recommendations to assure the heightened integrity of the financial reporting process. The
AICPA's Special Committee on Standards of Professional Conduct for Certified Public Accountants (the
Anderson Committee) made numerous recommendations intended to assure the long-term relevance and
effectiveness of the profession, and the Institute's Council has approved them for balloting by the member
ship later in 1987.
One recommendation of the Anderson Committee was put to a vote of the membership during the
year— a proposal to make membership in the SEC Practice Section (which the Board oversees) mandatory
for firms auditing SEC registrants if their partners were to retain their AICPA memberships. Although the
proposal garnered an impressive 61 percent affirmative vote, that fell short of the two-thirds required to
effect a bylaw change.
The failure of the Institute's membership to approve this proposal was disappointing. However, the
SEC has moved to achieve the same end by proposing that any accounting firm that audits an SEC registrant
must be a member of a peer review organization that requires at least triennial peer reviews and has a public
oversight body subject to SEC oversight. The Board has strongly endorsed the objective of this proposal since
our experience with the AICPA's program has provided us with incontrovertible evidence of the value of peer
review in assuring high quality audits.
The year has witnessed continuous improvement in the procedures for conducting peer reviews and
in the operations of the Special Investigations Committee. Particularly noteworthy has been the strengthen
ing of the procedures of the latter Committee by the adoption of a more structured investigative approach,
coupled with greater flexibility in reviewing documentation related to allegedly failed audits.
On a more personal note, during the past year, Arthur Wood, the last of the original members of the
Board, submitted his resignation as chairman and despite the strong urgings of his fellow Board members
also resigned from the Board. We miss his wisdom, his experience, his gentle and consistent leadership.
Joining us to replace Art Wood is Robert F. Froehlke. Like Art, Bob has had a distinguished career
in business, having recently retired as chairman of the Equitable Life Assurance Society and begun another
career as chairman of IDS Mutual Fund Group in Minneapolis. His fellow Board members are delighted that
he has consented to add the duties of a Board member to his other substantial commitments.
Respectfully submitted,
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Highlights and
Insights

"

The Public Oversight Board is p leased to be a b le to report
on ce again that the self-regulatory program o f the SEC Prac
tice Section fu n ction ed w ell during 1986-87 under the capa
ble guidance o f its com m ittees and is m aintaining and im proving the qu ality o f p ractice o f its
m em b er firm s. The Section's p eer review s h av e been con du cted w ith thoroughness an d w hen d efi
ciencies in or n on com p lian ce w ith firm s’ system s h av e been discerned, the Peer R eview C om m it
tee h as been unrem itting in insisting that corrective m easu res be taken. The Special Investigations
C om m ittee h as con scien tiou sly p ro b ed the qu ality control im plications o f audit failures alleged in
litigation an d h as d em an d ed changes w here its findings in d icated that the qu ality controls
n eed ed to b e strengthened. The B oard is also p lea sed to report that w hen ever the S ection ’s Peer
R eview or Special Investigations C om m ittees con clu ded that im provem ents in the qu ality control
system o f a m em b er firm w ere necessary, the firm prom ptly and w illingly m a d e the recom 
m en d ed changes."

The SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms is a voluntary member
ship organization intended for firms that audit SEC registrants, although many firms that have no
SEC clients have chosen to become members. The Section is responsible for developing and con
ducting a program to assure that the quality controls of its member firms are adequate and that
they are complied with. The principal tool used to achieve this goal is the triennial peer review to
which each member firm must submit. In addition, member firms must comply with stringent
membership requirements that also operate to assure enhanced quality in the conduct of audits of
SEC registrants.
Evaluation of Quality Control Systems
The Board has carefully overseen the
o f Firm s P eer R ev iew ed in 1986
activities of the Section since its inception. In
doing this, it has, with the assistance of its excel
lent professional staff, reviewed the activities of
10
No reportable deficiencies noted
both the Peer Review C o m m itte e and Special
Investigations Committee through various
Corrective action recommended
105
means. As in past years, Board representatives
attended each meeting of the Peer Review Com
Corrective action required in
mittee and its Evaluations and Recommenda
12
certain key policies and procedures
tions Subcommittee and applied one of its three
oversight programs to each of the 127 reviews
conducted in 1986.
In the course of performing the 127 reviews, peer reviewers concluded that 12 audits—
less than one percent of all those reviewed—were not reported on properly or were not performed
in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. In each case, the Peer Review Commit
tee deferred processing the peer review report until the Committee had been provided evidence
that the firm had taken or had planned to take appropriate action.

5

6

During the year, the Special Investiga
tions Committee opened or reopened files on 46
Summary of SIC Activity
cases alleging a firm had failed to conduct an
audit of an SEC registrant in accordance with
Case files open at July 1, 1986
33
professional standards. It was able to close its
files on 50 cases during the year, being assured,
where appropriate, that the firms involved had
Case files opened or reopened during year
46
taken appropriate corrective actions, but it
referred two of those cases to the Professional
Case files closed during year:
Ethics Division for further review of the per
After concluding that allegations had
formance of specific individuals.
no quality control implications
14
A number of improvements have been
made in the Section's programs based on accu
mulated experience and perceived needs. Heed
After concluding that the firm's quality
26
controls were not deficient
has been paid to the problem of "opinion shop
ping," which has distressed both the SEC and
responsible members of the profession, by add
After obtaining assurance that the
ing a new membership requirement and incorpo
firm had made or would make appropriate
rating in the peer review program procedures to
changes in its quality controls
10
assure that member firms have not accommo
dated "opinion shoppers." Other peer review
performance and reporting procedures have also
been refined as needed.
Initiatives and proposals to improve the quality of audits were advanced by several enti
ties in addition to the Section: the Securities and Exchange Commission, the "Treadway Commis
sion," the Auditing Standards Board, and the AICPA's "Anderson Committee." The significant
audit quality features of each of these initiatives are commented on in the Board's report.
The procedures of the Special Investigations Committee have been more formally struc
tured. Although the Committee focuses on the broad quality control implications of allegations
rather than on the specifics of a given case, provision has been made for the Committee and its
task forces to access selected workpapers prepared in connection with the audits being litigated.
As a result of these strengthened procedures and more detailed reporting to the SEC, the Board is
hopeful that the SEC will soon be able to express full confidence in the effectiveness of the special
investigations program, as it has with respect to the peer review program.
The Board commends all of those asso
ciated with the Section for their dedication of
Division
SEC
time, energy, and professional skill to this in
for CPA
Practice
Membership
creasingly effective program to maintain and
Firms
Section
increase the quality of audits by its member
firms.
While it is impossible to quantify the
1553
381
At July 1, 1986
number of substandard audits that have been
avoided as a result of this program, the experi
1710
395
ence of those associated with it fully justifies
At June 30, 1987
the conclusion that great benefits to the public
have flowed from it.

Report of the
Board
Introduction
and Summary
Conclusion

Th e P u b l ic O v e r s ig h t B o a r d is pleased to be able to report
once again that the self-regulatory program of the SEC Prac
tice Section functioned well during 1986-87 under the ca
pable guidance of its committees and is maintaining and improving the quality of practice of its
member firms. The Section's peer reviews have been conducted with thoroughness and when defi
ciencies in or noncompliance with firms' systems have been discerned, the Peer Review Commit
tee has been unremitting in insisting that corrective measures be taken. The Special Investiga
tions Committee has conscientiously probed the quality control implications of audit failures
alleged in litigation and has demanded changes where its findings indicated that the quality con
trols needed to be strengthened. The Board is also pleased to report that whenever the Section's
Peer Review or Special Investigations Committees concluded that improvements in the quality
control system of a member firm were necessary the firm promptly and willingly made the rec
ommended changes.
Before reporting on the activities of the Board, it is appropriate to comment briefly on the
actions that have been taken by others within and without the accounting profession to maintain
and improve the quality of auditing in the United States.
During the past year, the role and responsibility of the auditor, and the quality of auditing
generally, were the focal points of several major studies and activities. The Auditing Standards
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants issued exposure drafts on ten
proposed standards. The major ones, when adopted, will (a) clarify the auditor's responsibility for
the detection of errors, irregularities, and illegal acts, (b) clarify the auditor's responsibility for eval
uating and reporting on internal controls, (c) provide for expanded communication of matters to
audit committees, and (d) establish standards for conducting an examination of management's
discussion and analysis. Adoption of these standards will clarify or increase the role of the inde
pendent auditor and should enhance further the credibility of the auditor's report.
A wide-ranging study of the financial reporting system in the United States was con
ducted by the independent National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting chaired by
former SEC Commissioner James C. Treadway, Jr. The Commission studied the roles and inter
relationships of persons and organizations involved in the financial reporting process in the
United States and made a series of recommendations, several of which deal with the role and
responsibility of the auditor.
The Securities and Exchange Commission recently published for comment a proposal
which would require that financial statements filed with the Commission be certified by an audi
tor whose accounting and auditing practice has been subjected to an independent peer review
within the prior three years.
Several other activities of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants are
directly aimed at improving the quality of audit practice in the U.S. The AICPA Special Commit
tee on Standards of Professional Conduct for Certified Public Accountants issued a report recom
mending far-reaching changes in the profession's code of professional ethics, mandatory continu
ing professional education, mandatory participation in a quality review program, and additional
educational requirements for entry into the profession. The Council of the Institute has endorsed
these recommendations and they are to be submitted to the membership for vote in late 1987.
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While the paramount responsibility of the Public Oversight Board is to oversee the activi
ties of the SEC Practice Section, the Board has a keen interest in any and all initiatives to improve
the quality of audit practice, including those which originate outside the SEC Practice Section.
Because of the far-reaching effects of the ten proposed revisions to auditing standards being consid
ered by the Auditing Standards Board, members of our staff were instructed to monitor closely and
report on any and all developments regarding the proposed changes in the role and responsibility
of the auditor. In addition, members of the Public Oversight Board, either individually or as a body,
met with several other groups to discuss the issues and current developments regarding the
accounting profession and its self-regulatory program.
The primary objective of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms
is to maintain and improve the quality of the accounting and auditing practice of member firms
before the Securities and Exchange Commission. This annual report describes the Board's over
sight of the Section's programs, the initiatives of the Section and those of other organizations to
maintain and improve audit quality. The Board neither has nor needs line authority over the Sec
tion. Our suggestions for the development and refinement of the policies, standards, and opera
tions of the Section are given serious consideration by the Section and are generally adopted. The
Section's activities are described in greater detail in the appendices.

Board
Activities

8

The Board consists of five members who are not involved in the public
accounting profession and whose backgrounds provide a broad spectrum
of experience.
Arthur M. Wood, who was the last remaining charter member of the Board, retired from
the Board effective December 31, 1986. A. A. Sommer, Jr., who had been vice chairman, was
elected to succeed Mr. Wood as chairman and Robert K. Mautz was elected vice chairman. Robert
F. Froehlke joined the Board in July 1987. Melvin R. Laird and Paul W. McCracken continued their
services as Board members.
The Board chairman attends meetings of the Section's Executive and Planning Commit
tees. Mr. Mautz is the Board's liaison with the Special Investigations Committee and attends most
of its meetings and some meetings of its task forces. Other Board members also occasionally
attend meetings of the Section's committees.
The Board is assisted by a staff of four experienced CPAs and two administrative person
nel. Richard A. Stark, a partner in the New York law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy,
has served as the Board's legal counsel since its inception.
The Board meets monthly to consider issues as they arise and to review events since the
last meeting. During the year, the Board also met formally or informally with various individuals
or groups to discuss the Section's self-regulatory program and other initiatives to improve audit
quality.
■ In July 1986, the Board met in open meeting with members of the Securities and Exchange Com
mission which oversees private sector processes for setting accounting and auditing standards as
well as the activities of the SEC Practice Section. The meeting was used to exchange views on
the effectiveness and credibility of the special investigative process, the performance of manage
ment advisory services for audit clients, and other issues of mutual interest. It is the intention
of the Board to meet annually with the Commission to discuss topics of current interest.
■ In July 1986, the Board met with the Honorable Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the
U.S. to exchange views on the quality of audits of governmental agencies, disciplinary actions
taken by accounting firms, and other issues.
■ In July 1986, the Board convened a meeting of the house counsels of eleven major CPA firms to
discuss the special investigative process and the effects of proposed changes in auditing stan
dards on litigation risk of CPA firms.

Board Members
A. A. Sommer, Jr., Chairman, 1986-; joined Board in 1983; SEC Commissioner, 1973-76;
Partner in Washington, DC law firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius specializing in
securities law.

▼ Robert K. Mautz, Vice Chairman,
joined Board in 1981; Professor Emeri
tus of the University of Illinois and the
University of Michigan.

►Arthur M. Wood, Chairman, 1984-86; char
ter member of the Board, Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive Officer of Sears,
Roebuck and Co., 1973-78.

Melvin R. Laird, joined Board in 1984; nine-term
U.S. Congressman, 1953-69; Secretary of Defense,
1969-73; Counsellor to the President, 1973-74;
Senior Counsellor for National and International
Affairs, The Reader’s Digest Association, Inc.

►Paul W. McCracken, joined Board in
1985; Chairman of the President’s
Council of Economic Advisers, 1969-71;
President of the American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research,
1986; Edmund Ezra Day Distinguished
University Professor Emeritus of
Business Administration, Economics,
and Public Policy at University of
Michigan.

Legal Counsel
T Richard A. Stark, Legal Counsel to Board since
1977; partner in New York law firm of Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley &McCloy specializing in securi
ties law.
►Robert F. Froehlke, joined
Board in 1987; Secretary
of the Army, 1971-73;
Chairman of the Board of
Equitable Life Assurance
Society, 1982-87; President
and CEO of IDS Mutual
Fund Group.

Staff Members

Louis W. Matusiak, Execu
tive Director since 1978;
partner in Alexander Grant
&Company, 1964-78; Direc
tor of Professional Develop
ment, AICPA, 1958-64;
Professor, University of
Detroit, 1950-57, Chairman
of Accounting Department,
1953-57.

Charles J. Evers, Technical
Director since 1980; senior
staff member of FASB,
1977-80; Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell &Co., 1961-77,
audit partner in New York
office, 1971-77.
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■ In January 1987, the Board met with Audit
ing Standards Board Chairman Jerry Sullivan
and AICPA Vice President Dan Guy to discuss
audit quality initiatives to close the "expecta
tion gap" concerning auditor responsibility
and performance.
■ In February 1987, the Board met with Michael
Barrett, chief staff aide to Congressman John J.
Dingell, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, to
review current developments in the accounting
profession's self-regulatory program and
initiatives undertaken to improve the quality
of audit practice.
■ In March 1987, the Board met with John C.
Burton, former SEC Chief Accountant and
currently Dean and Arthur Young Professor of
Columbia University Graduate School of Busi
ness, to discuss the objectives of self-regula
tion.
■ In April 1987, the Board met with Wallace E.
Olson to gain the benefit of his views and per
spectives on the effectiveness of the self-regula
tory program and the role of the Board. Mr.
Olson, who was then AICPA President, played
a key role in the establishment of the Division
for CPA Firms.
■ In May 1987, the Board met with representa
tives of the Section to discuss the concurring
partner review membership requirement.

Alan H. Feldman, Assistant
Technical Director since
1980; Touche Ross & Co.,
1969-80, Director of Profes
sional Standards Review in
Boston office, 1978-80.

John F. Cullen, Assistant
Technical Director since
January 1987; Manager,
AICPA SEC Practice Sec
tion, 1979-81; Associate
Director of Quality Control,
KMG Main Hurdman,
1981-87.

Throughout the year, Chairman Sommer
maintained an active liaison with members and
staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission
and the National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting.
Such meetings provide the Board with
valuable outside perspectives to supplement the
detailed written and oral reports of its staff. Thus,
the Board has general access to information and
viewpoints essential in evaluating the effective
ness of the Section's self-regulatory program and
the adequacy of initiatives affecting the profession.

Oversight of the
Peer Review
Process

The Board and its staff monitor all activities constituting the peer re
view process. Representatives of the Board attend meetings of the Peer
Review Committee and its Evaluations and Recommendations Sub
committee and the Board's staff reviews each peer review performed.

As in prior years, one of the POB's three oversight pro
grams was used to evaluate the performance on each peer review conducted in 1986:
■ Visitation and workpaper review program—observation of the performance of the field work,
attendance at the exit conference during which the review team reports its findings and recom
mendations to management of the reviewed firm, and review of the review team's workpapers,
reports, and the reviewed firm's response, or
■ Workpaper review program—review of the review team's workpapers and reports and the firm's
response, or
■ Report review program—review of the review team's reports and selected portions of its workpapers, and the firm's response.
Scope of Board Oversight of 1986 Peer Reviews Classified by Number of SEC Registrants
Audited by Reviewed Firms
Firms with 5 or more SEC clients

Firms with 1 to 4 SEC clients

Firms with no SEC clients
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Visitation and Workpaper Review

Workpaper Review

Report Review

The specific oversight program applied to a given review is determined by a number of
factors including:
■ Attributes of the reviewed firm:
□ Number of SEC registrants it audits.
□ Size of its professional staff.
□ Number of times it has been peer reviewed and type of report received on its last review.
□ Type of POB oversight program used to evaluate its prior review.
■ Attributes of the review team:
□ Performance of team captain on prior reviews.
□ Type of POB program used to evaluate the team captain's performance on prior reviews.
Application of this approach results in some reviews being assigned automatically to
the visitation-workpaper review program. The type of oversight program assigned to other reviews
is on a random basis.
When the visitation-workpaper review program is applied to the review of a multi-office
firm, the program calls for POB staff to observe the performance of the review team at one or more
operating offices, to attend exit conferences held at such operating offices, and to attend the final
conference at which the review findings are reported to top management. As a result, POB staff
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members, at times accompanied by a Board member, attended a total of 76 operating and final exit
conferences held in conjunction with reviews of the 49 firms to which the POB applied its most
intensive oversight program.
Representatives of the Board attended each of the five meetings the Peer Review Commit
tee held during the year. POB representatives also attended each meeting of the Evaluations and
Recommendations Subcommittee. Based in large part on the review by AICPA staff of the review
teams' workpapers, the Subcommittee recommends whether the Committee should accept the
review team's report as submitted and whether such acceptance should be conditioned upon the
reviewed firm agreeing to take specified corrective action. The Board's staff communicates the
results obtained from the application of its oversight programs to the Subcommittee and occasion
ally to the full Committee. All differences of opinion between the POB staff and the Committee as
to whether an individual review was conducted and reported on in accordance with standards are
reported to and discussed in detail by the Board.
The Board finds its access to the peer review process of the Section entirely satisfactory.
Since POB representatives have "privilege of the floor," the POB's views are made known and con
sidered by the Committee in making its decisions on setting or revising established standards and
administrative procedures. Discussion at Committee meetings is free and frank. Board and staff
members have adequate opportunity to express their views and criticisms which are duly consid
ered by the Committee.
An important procedural change was made during the year at the Board's suggestion.
While Committee members had previously abstained from voting on the acceptance of peer
review reports in which they had an interest as either a member of the review team or reviewed
firm, the Committee changed its administrative procedures to require such Committee members
to absent themselves during the Committee's discussion of the peer review report.
The Board is convinced that the peer review program is functioning effectively and accom
plishing the purposes for which it was intended.
The Board's staff also evaluates the Committee's monitoring program. In cases where the
review team uncovered significant negative findings, the Committee requires the firm, as a condi
tion for accepting its peer review report, to take specific corrective action and to provide evidence
to the Committee that such action achieved the intended result. The Board commends the review
teams for their diligence in requiring firms to adhere to standards. The Committee is also to be
commended for its insistence that each and every review be performed and reported on in strict
accordance with standards and for its insistence that firms whose quality control systems are
found to be in need of significant revision provide the Committee with evidence that appropriate
corrective actions have been implemented effectively. However, the Board is concerned about the
amount of time it takes to resolve problems encountered in some reviews. As a result, there is
delay in requiring such firms to implement the corrective actions considered necessary. Sixteen
reports of 1986 peer reviews were unprocessed as of June 30, 1987, even though the field work for
all but one of these reviews was completed at least five months earlier. The Board has urged the
Committee to examine its procedures and take such action as may be required to expedite the
processing of problem reviews.
Improvements in Quality of Practice Peer review is enhancing the quality of accounting
and auditing services performed by member firms. Most firms that were reviewed in 1986 and had
had a prior review had improved their quality controls and compliance therewith; however, seven
firms received a less desirable report. The Board especially commends five firms, each of whom
had made significant improvements in its quality control system following receipt of a qualified
report in the prior review so as to receive an unqualified report in 1986.
The Board notes, however, that three firms that had received qualified reports on their
prior reviews had not implemented effective corrective actions and thus received qualified reports
again in 1986. Two of the reviews were accelerated reviews; the third firm, whose prior review
had been in 1983, had been found on an earlier revisit by the team captain to have implemented
revised policies and procedures and corrected the deficiency. The 1986 review team concluded,

however, that the firm had reverted to its former practices, thus resulting in the firm's receiving
another qualified peer review report. The Committee is subjecting the corrective action plans of
these three firms to extensive and intensive monitoring. The Committee is also planning to moni
tor the implementation of the action plans of the seven firms that had received unqualified reports
on their prior reviews but received qualified reports in 1986.
The situations described in the preceding paragraph evidence the need for a firm to have
its quality control system independently reviewed every three years and for the Peer Review Com
mittee to obtain assurance that a firm is effectively implementing corrective actions, when such
corrective actions are considered mandatory to give the firm reasonable assurance of conforming
with professional standards in the performance of accounting and auditing engagements.
Ninety seven firms reviewed in 1986 received unqualified peer review reports as they had
in 1983. However, all but nine of these firms received a letter of comments concerning their qual
ity controls or compliance therewith.

(Left) SECPS Executive Committee Chairman John Abernathy attended a small group luncheon to express the Section's appreciation to outgoing
POB Chairman Art Wood and to congratulate Al Sommer on being named Mr. Wood’s successor. (Right) AICPA President Phil Chenok with POB
members Mel Laird and Bob Mautz at outgoing POB chairman's “farewell lunch.”

In an attempt to quantify the improvement in quality of practice effected as a result of
the peer review process, the Board's staff coded and analyzed the deficiencies reported in the let
ters of comments issued to firms reviewed in 1986 and those reported in letters of comments
issued to these firms on their immediately prior peer review. After excluding comments relating to
application of auditing standards that became effective within the three-year period, our analysis
showed a marked decline in deficiencies relating to the element of supervision. As a result,
engagements reviewed in 1986 had considerably fewer instances of misapplication of generally
accepted auditing standards. On the other hand, deficiencies in planning audits increased, reflect
ing, we believe, evaluation by the peer review process of compliance with Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 47, "Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit," which was required to be
applied for audit periods beginning after June 30, 1984. Similarly, there was an increase in deficien
cies cited in the conduct of audits relating to audit sampling which, we believe, reflects reviewer
evaluation of compliance with Statement on Auditing Standards No. 39, "Audit Sampling," which
was required to be applied on engagements with periods ending on or after June 25, 1983.
The fact that there is need for improved audit planning and conduct of audits in those
respects further underscores the value of peer review as a mechanism that enforces compliance
with new or revised auditing standards. It is apparent that there is a learning curve in the imple
mentation of new standards across all firms from the largest to the smallest. Peer review, we
believe, accelerates the learning and implementation processes. Our Board believes that this will
be especially significant to the public interest as firms discharge their audit responsibility when
and if the ten new standards now being considered for issuance by the Auditing Standards Board
are adopted.
The Board strongly believes in the importance of private regulation, that is, the internal
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monitoring and review and resultant quality control improvement that occurs within firms. For
that reason, we were disappointed by a rise in deficiencies concerning the internal inspection pro
gram of firms particularly with respect to the timeliness of inspection and implementation of cor
rective action by some firms. We applaud the strong action taken by the Peer Review Committee
which has required such firms to demonstrate improved quality in these respects by having to
submit future performance of their inspections to Committee oversight.
In summary our analysis of comparative peer review results and first-hand impressions
gained through our staff oversight program lead us to conclude that peer review has had and will
continue to have an important role in the enhancement of quality controls of Section member
firms. The Board has made the details of its special analysis available to the Committee for its use
in providing guidance to review teams.
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Concurring Partner Review The Board believes that review of an audit engagement by a
partner in addition to the engagement partner can and should provide a firm with significant addi
tional assurance that its engagements are performed in all material respects in accordance with
professional standards. Review by a second or concurring partner, however, is required only for
audits of SEC registrants and certain other specified types of companies performed by firms that
are members of the SEC Practice Section. Neither generally accepted auditing standards nor qual
ity control standards require that audits be subjected to review by a partner other than the engage
ment partner.
The concurring partner review membership requirement has recently been strengthened
by the Section— in large part at our urging—essentially to require that certain workpapers as well
as the audit report and financial statements be subjected to review by the second partner. The
effectiveness of the implementation of the expanded requirement will be first tested in peer
reviews conducted in 1987.
An analysis made by the Board's staff revealed a wide variation in the procedures adopted
by firms to assure compliance with the concurring partner review membership requirement. A
firm is allowed considerable discretion in defining the procedures that its concurring reviewers are
to perform; further, each firm is allowed to stipulate the degree or amount of additional assurance
it is to derive from review by the concurring review partner.
As a result, the Board met in May 1987 with
representatives of the Section's Peer Review and Special
Investigations Committees to discuss the Board's analy
sis. That discussion confirmed the existence of wide
differences of opinion among CPA firms as to how
much additional assurance a concurring partner review
should provide and the amount of responsibility that
the concurring reviewer should be assigned for the qual
ity of the audit. Such differences exist even among the
large national firms. We were further advised that very
few firms charge a concurring reviewer with responsi
bility for doing so comprehensive a review as to provide SECPS Peer Review Committee Chairman Dave
the firm with positive assurance that the audit was con Pearson, shown with POB Chairman Al Sommer,
headed a small delegation of Section representa
ducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing
tives to discuss the concurring partner review
requirement at the May 1987 Board meeting.
standards and that the financial statements were pre
pared in all material respects in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. How
ever, the Board notes that the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting seems to
concur that these are appropriate objectives of a concurring partner review. The Commission rec
ommends that such review should provide the firm with assurance that the audit was designed
(and performed) so as to detect fraudulent financial reporting.
The Board is concerned about the differences regarding the degree of assurance that a
concurring partner review should provide. We are aware that two firms can have equally effective

quality control systems and yet have quite different quality control procedures. Further, equally
effective methods of documenting the results of auditing procedures— i.e., the form, content, and
organization of workpapers— can and do vary widely among firms. Thus, the Board recognizes
the difficulty inherent in specifying procedures that all firms should require of their concurring
review partners. However, the Board believes that the Section should more clearly define the de
gree of assurance that a concurring review should provide and has urged the Section to give
further consideration to clarifying the objective of concurring review.
The Board concurs with the National Commission's recommendation that the scope of
the concurring review should be designed to reduce the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting.
The Board believes that a concurring partner review should be required of all auditing firms, or
alternatively at a minimum to audits of public companies. Accordingly, we have recommended
that the Auditing Standards Board consider incorporating a concurring partner review requirement
into the quality control standards, and issuing guidance to firms as to how and when it should be
applied.
The Special Investigations Committee (SIC) was organized late in
1979 as a supplement to the peer review program. The SIC grew out
of the belief by the Section that when a suit was brought against a
Section member, immediate inquiry should be made as to whether
the charges might indicate a deficiency in the firm's quality controls or its compliance with them
or whether they might indicate a need for clarification of professional standards. Thus, the Section
adopted a membership requirement calling on member firms to promptly report to the Section
any suit brought against them or their personnel either by the SEC or a private party involving
the audit of a client that files financial reports with the SEC or other government regulators
pursuant to SEC regulations.
The purpose of the special investigative process is not to investigate whether the charges
in the suit are justified. Those determinations are made by the SEC and the civil courts. For the
Section or the SIC to undertake such an inquiry and determination would be a costly and needless
duplication of processes that already exist.
A task force of SIC members is assigned to each case. The task force reads the financial
statements in question and reviews other available relevant information and applicable accounting
and auditing literature.
In many cases it is clear from a mere reading of the complaint that the charges made have
no relevance to the work of the auditor; for instance, they do not charge any departure from
accounting principles or auditing standards.
When the complaint does
allege an audit failure, the task force
initiates discussions with members of
the defendant firm (frequently includ
ing personnel associated with the sub
ject audit) concerning the case and
often examines relevant guidance
materials issued by the firm. If
through these procedures the task
force is unable to satisfy itself that the
firm's quality controls, as they relate
to the allegations in the suit, are ade
quate, the task force may recommend
POB Vice Chairman Bob Mautz frequently attended meetings of the SIC in his
to the SIC that a "special review" be
capacity as Board liaison to the Special Investigations Committee.
performed with respect to all or only
to specific relevant quality controls of the firm. If at any stage the task force determines that the
firm is deficient in its quality control procedures or compliance with them, it will recommend to
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the SIC that the firm be required to take the necessary corrective measures, and these recommen
dations are typically confirmed by the Committee. In every instance to date, the firms have com
plied with demands and suggestions made.
Oversight of SIC Activities in 1986-87 The Board exercises close oversight of the activi
ties of the SIC. Vice Chairman Robert K. Mautz has served as the Board's liaison to the SIC for
several years, and members of the staff have attended all such meetings as well as most task force
meetings. The staff typically reads the financial statements pertinent to the case, related corre
spondence, relevant accounting and auditing literature, and usually attends meetings with firm
personnel to discuss quality control implications of the allegedly faulty engagement.
Members of the Board's staff, often accompanied by Mr. Mautz, attended (a) each of the
six meetings held by the Committee during the year, (b) a substantial majority of meetings of SIC
task forces with representatives of firms involved in litigation to discuss allegations in reported
cases, and (c) ten of the eleven meetings SIC task forces held with the captain of the firm's peer
review team either to discuss the results of the firm's previous peer review in the light of the alle
gations, or to review and discuss the scope of an imminent peer review and later the results of
such review.
The staff furnishes to the Board memoranda prepared by SIC staff for all cases which
include summaries of the allegations, the accounting and auditing issues involved, their judg
ments with respect to the significance of the litigation, and the bases for those conclusions. The
SIC's activities with respect to cases are reviewed at monthly Board meetings to determine
whether the SIC is properly fulfilling its responsibilities.
Enhancing Credibility of the Process As noted elsewhere in this report, the SEC has in
its most recent report to Congress once more stated its confidence in the peer review process.
However, it has been unable to so state with regard to the SIC process.
This inability has stemmed largely from the Commission staff's concern whether the SIC
has access to sufficient information to permit it to make appropriate judgments, and from the
staff's conclusion that it did not have access to sufficient information about the activities of the
Committee to permit the Commission to exercise its oversight role.
These difficulties have their roots in the peculiar sensitivity of the environment in which
the SIC conducts its activities.
Like all litigants, member firms are extremely reluctant to do anything they think may
jeopardize their ability to defend against charges made against them. This sensitivity has been
heightened in recent years as the amounts of settlements and judgments have escalated sharply.
Consequently, when the SIC was organized it was understood that, as mentioned, the process
would not eventuate in a judgment concerning the quality or adequacy of the questioned audit.
Further, the firms were also concerned that if the SIC were given access to the documentation
related to such an audit for purposes of review, the Committee's personnel who examined the doc
umentation might be compelled to give testimony concerning their review and any conclusions
they drew from it, even if their function was not to reach any such conclusion.
Thus, it was initially understood that the SIC would not have access to the workpapers
associated with an allegedly failed audit. However, neither the Section nor the Board felt that this
condition unduly inhibited the work of the SIC, since alternative procedures were available to per
mit the assembly of information from which a sound judgment might be made concerning the
adequacy of a firm's quality control policies and procedures and its compliance with them as
related to a complainant's allegations. For instance, SIC task forces have, where appropriate,
reviewed other audits performed by the personnel associated with the audit in question, audits
performed by the firm of entities in the same industry as the client for which the allegedly failed
audit was performed, and audits performed by the same office. Through these and other means,
the SIC has been able, to the Board's satisfaction, to determine when allegations suggested possible
quality control problems in the firm.
However, it was perceived that the lack of access to relevant papers associated with the
questioned audit created an inefficiency in the process, and, moreover, created uncertainty in

some quarters whether all was indeed being done that could be done to assure the effectivness of
the SIC's program.
Reevaluation and Subsequent Revision of the Process The Board carefully reviewed
with its counsel, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, the problems associated with expanding SIC
access to documentation associated with an audit involved in litigation. Next, in the summer of
1986, the Board asked the counsel for the firms represented on the Section's Executive Committee
to meet to discuss the matter. At that meeting, which was characterized by a professional discus
sion of outstanding candor, forthrightness, and competence, there emerged the outlines of an
approach to access which hopefully promote a more efficient and effective SIC process and answer
the concerns of those who felt there should be greater access.
To deal further with these matters, the Section's Executive Committee appointed the
Task Force on SIC Methodology. The task force, headed by Mr. Frank Rossi, Vice Chairman of
Arthur Andersen & Co. and a member of the Executive Committee, included another member of
the Executive Committee, one former and one current member of the SIC, and two attorneys who
serve as house counsel to firms represented on the Executive Committee.
After extensive deliberations, all of which were attended by members and staff of the
Board and which were reviewed carefully and critically at Board meetings, the task force made its
report to the Executive Committee in April 1987, which approved it and, with a minor change,
implemented its recommendations.
The recommendations adopted by the Executive Committee were these:
First, a more "structured" procedure was adopted. This approach describes the procedures
that should be followed in the various stages of inquiry. It also spells out with reasonable precision
the factors that should be considered in deciding whether to proceed to the next stage— i.e., gen
eral inquiry, in-depth inquiry, and special review—or to close the file on a case.
Second, the SIC, when it deems it appropriate in connection with its inquiries, is to be
given access to certain audit documentation, such as audit planning and consultation memoranda
and summary reviews of audit issues, that might enable the Committee to evaluate whether
appropriate attention was given by appropriate individuals during the course of the audit to the
issues addressed by the allegations. There may be instances in which a firm believes providing
such access may seriously jeopardize its litigation posture. In such cases, the task force must use
other means, which may include a special review, to satisfy itself concerning the adequacy of the
firm's quality controls and compliance with them. The Board intends to review closely those
instances in which requests for access are denied and, if it concludes a refusal is unwarranted or
seriously impedes the work of the SIC, it will urge upon the Section the adoption of stronger incen
tives for firms to provide access.
Third, more com
prehensive and informa
tive summaries will be
furnished to the SEC
when a case is closed. The
Commission staff has felt
that the summaries fur
nished under earlier
arrangements did not pro
vide them with the infor
mation necessary for them
to carry out their over
sight function. The new
Proposed revisions to auditing standards was the subject of discussion among Auditing Stan
dards Board Chairman ferry Sullivan, AICPA Vice President-Auditing Dan Guy, POB Chairman
summaries will include a
Al Sommer, POB Executive Director Lou Matusiak and POB Vice Chairman Bob Mautz.
delineation of the specific
issues considered (including those identified in any SEC releases relating to the case), the interviews
conducted, the types of audit documentation reviewed, and the bases for the SIC's conclusions.
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Fourth, the SIC will meet regularly with the Commission staff to discuss SIC policies
and procedures, concerns the staff may have with actions taken on case files which have been
closed, and any changes the Commission believes would make the process more effective.
The Board has since the inception of the SIC had full access to the SIC process and has
been able to satisfy itself that this part of the Section's program has been carried out satisfactorily
in accordance with the mandate given the SIC. The inability of the SEC to accord it the confidence
it has accorded the peer review process has been a continuing source of concern to the Board, and
as a consequence the Board has diligently urged and pursued a course intended to gain the Com
mission's confidence in the SIC.
The Board is hopeful that as the new procedures are implemented the Commission and
its staff may gain the level of confidence in the SIC process that the Board has. In its most recent
published report, the SEC notes that: "The Commission is encouraged by the continuing efforts to
improve the SIC process."1
In November 1986, the Board publicly distributed a report prepared by
a professional research organization entitled, Public Perceptions o f
M anagem ent A dvisory Services Perform ed by CPA Firms for A udit
Clients. While no instance of impaired auditor independence or objectivity related to the rendition
of management advisory services (MAS) had come to our attention, the Board initiated this
research study because it is concerned that the continuous expansion of consulting services may
be perceived as impairing auditor independence and adversely affect the value of the audit function
over time.
In preparation for the survey, the Board obtained promotional materials, advertisements,
and other information from firms, and identified the types of services being offered. The survey
included a sample of such services. The survey responses indicated that key public groups perceive
that certain types of MAS are likely to impair auditor objectivity and independence. About half or
more of respondents in each of the key public groups surveyed indicated that the following engage
ments, when performed for an audit client, could cause a "great deal of" or "some" impairment:
■ Negotiating mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures (76%)
■ Performing actuarial services which directly affect amounts involved on the balance sheet (64%)
■ Implementing a strategic plan (63%)
■ Identifying merger and acquisition candidates (62%)
■ Valuing assets acquired in a business combination (61%)
■ Executive search for senior management personnel (56%)
■ Renegotiations or redetermining price under procurement contracts (50%)
■ Developing a strategic plan (49%)
■ Developing an executive compensation plan (47%)
In response to a survey question, audit committee chairmen indicated that their commit
tees review MAS engagements performed by their auditors for impairment of auditor indepen
dence and, for the most part, conduct such review before the services are performed. In that con
nection, it should be noted that data on MAS fees are required to be reported by member firms to
the audit committees of SEC registrants and to the Section for its public files. The latter data indi
cates that almost 80 percent of the SEC registrants audited by SECPS member firms obtain no
MAS services from their auditor.
The Board published the report without comment and indicated that the results of the
survey may be useful to the Section as well as to individual firms in deciding what action, if any,
should be taken to change the perceptions of various groups caused by performance of certain
types of MAS engagements. The Board believes that the information contained in the Board's
report will also be useful to firms in developing policies for the rendition of advisory services and
to companies in making judgments in these instances.
The Board continues to observe with keen interest the continual growth in consulting

Scope of Services
By CPA Firms

18

services provided by accounting firms and the effect that such activity has on their operations and
on the public. A recent article in Forbes magazine epitomizes the Board's concern:
"Happily accounting remains for now at least one of the nation's most admired
professions, as shown by a recent Louis Harris poll of shareholders and business leaders
who believed accounting to have the highest moral practices of any major profession—bet
ter than college professors, lawyers, congressmen, journalists.
Yet if something happens to that credibility, there is more at risk than simply the
fortunes of the men and women in the green eyeshades. In theory, it is fine if accounting
firms want to pursue opportunities in related business fields like strategic or financial con
sulting. There's even a strong contingent of thought that such endeavors will help the firms
better understand their clients—and as a result do better audits for them. But the stakes
involved are huge. In the practical world of the marketplace, certified public accountants
are the only guarantors of financial integrity the capitalist system has. The further the
industry strays from its roots, the bigger the chance of doing damage to its credibility with
the public, and that is something from which ultimately no one can profit."2

Other Initiatives
to Improve Quality
of Audit Practice

Considerable effort has been expended by various entities this past year
to enhance audit quality particularly in the development of auditing
standards designed to eliminate the insidious practice of "opinion shop
ping," to close the expectation gap concerning auditor responsibilities,
and to improve the quality of auditing and expand the role of the auditor.
Minimizing Instances of Opinion Shopping The concept of obtaining a second profes
sional opinion is generally accepted in certain fields, especially that of medicine. A second opinion
guards against following the advice of an ultra-conservative or ultra-liberal. In this context, it is
proper for management to seek a second opinion on the application of generally accepted account
ing principles in situations where professional literature is not explicit. However, application of
this concept does not condone continuance of the search until one finds an auditor who will agree
with management's desired accounting treatment, a practice generally referred to as "opinion
shopping." The profession has taken several decisive actions to eliminate, or at least minimize,
this sort of abuse.
During 1986, SECPS mem
ber firms were required to establish
policies and procedures for their
personnel to follow whenever a non
client requests an opinion on the
application of an accounting princi
ple. Such procedures generally
require consultation with designated
specialists in the firm and assign
ment of designated partners to mon
itor adherence to such policies and
procedures. Peer reviewers are now
Wally Olson, who as AICPA President played a vital role in the creation of the
required to test the firm's compli
Division for CPA Firms, was invited to discuss with the Board suggestions for
ance with such established policies
improving the credibility and effectiveness of the accounting profession’s selfregulatory program.
and procedures.
In July 1986, the Auditing Standards Board issued an auditing standard, "Reports on the
Application of Accounting Principles," which requires all practitioners to follow procedures simi
lar to those formerly required only of SECPS member firms, including required consultation with
the "shopper's" accountant to ascertain whether the auditor asked to express an opinion has been
given all the facts relevant to rendering a professional judgment. The issuance of this standard
obviated the need for a specific membership requirement; accordingly it was dropped in Decem
ber. However, the Board is pleased to note that enforcement of the auditing standard will be given
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high priority in SECPS peer reviews.
The Section recently revised its peer review program to require peer reviewers (a) to
obtain a list of SEC engagements accepted by the firm since the last peer review where, as
reported in a Form 8-K or similar public filing, the former accountant resigned or there was a
reported disagreement on an accounting or reporting matter and (b) to ascertain if any opinion on
the application of generally accepted accounting principles was rendered prior to acceptance of the
entity as an audit client and, if so, whether such opinion was issued in accordance with the firm's
procedures. In addition, peer reviewers are required to review current or prior period workpapers to
the extent necessary to evaluate whether any matters which led to resignation of the predecessor
auditor or which were the basis for a disagreement were handled appropriately. We believe these
procedures will minimize the instances of auditors accommodating "opinion shoppers" and will
enable reviewers to detect situations where the successor auditor accommodated an "opinion
shopper."
Closing the Expectation Gap There has long been a wide difference of opinion between
users of audited financial statements regarding an auditor's responsibilities and the auditor's own
view of what those responsibilities are. The Board believes that significant progress was made this
past year to close this so-called "expectation gap." The Board commends the Auditing Standards
Board for its diligent efforts to both improve auditing standards and procedures and more clearly
define auditors' responsibilities.
In February 1987, the Auditing Standards Board exposed for public comment ten new
standards which, among other things, are designed to clarify the auditor's responsibility for and
enhance detection of fraud, improve auditor communications with financial report users and with
audit committees, and provide early warning about possible financial failure. These proposals offer
guidance to auditors to improve the effectiveness of audits, a subject which has been a matter of
concern to both the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and the National Com
mission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
Mandatory Peer Reviews While member firms of the SEC Practice Section audit a pre
dominant majority of the financial statements of public companies (see Appendix D), the Board
believes the public interest would be best served if all auditors, especially those of public compan
ies, were required to undergo peer review periodically. The Board has continually expressed the
hope that this could be accomplished voluntarily throughout the profession. Consequently, the
Board applauded the actions of the AICPA Board of Directors and Council in recommending that
the AICPA's bylaws be amended, as the Special Committee on Standards of Professional Conduct
for Certified Public Accountants had urged. If so amended, the bylaws would have required that a
member in public practice as a partner, shareholder, or proprietor in a firm auditing one or more
SEC registrants could retain an individual membership in the AICPA only if the member's firm
were a member of the SEC Practice Section.
The Board was perplexed and disappointed by the results of the balloting—perplexed that
only 54 percent of the members cast a ballot on so important an issue (only 130,000 of the esti
mated 240,000 members voted), and disappointed that the proposal was not favorably voted on by
the two-to-one margin necessary for a bylaw change (the proposal received a 61 percent favorable
vote).
The Board will be disappointed if the Institute membership rejects the recommendation
of the Special Committee on Standards of Professional Conduct for Certified Public Accountants
(the "Anderson Committee") that would require, as a condition for AICPA membership, participa
tion by the member's firm in the Institute's quality review program. If adopted, firms joining the
quality review program would be required to undergo an independent review of their quality con
trol policies and procedures and compliance therewith every three years.
The Board believes peer review is the most effective means available to a profession to
improve and maintain the quality of service its members provide. Our extensive involvement with
the peer review program of the SEC Practice Section has convinced us that it works and works
well. Therefore, we are gratified by the actions of the National Commission on Fraudulent Finan

cial Reporting3and the SEC4 in endorsing the objective that all public accounting firms that audit
public companies should belong to a professional organization that requires periodic peer reviews.
The Board urges, however, that any implementation of a mandatory peer review program
be accomplished within a self-regulatory framework. We see no need for the SEC to require a rigid
or very structured relationship with a peer review organization since the SEC has found its current
access to the Section's peer review process sufficient for it to form its own independent judgment
regarding its effectiveness.s The Board has expressed these views to the Securities and Exchange
Commission. A copy of our comment letter to the SEC on its proposal is reproduced as Exhibit I.
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting Private sector concerns about
incidences of fraudulent financial reporting resulted in appointment of an independent commis
sion to study the causes of fraudulent financial reporting and recommend steps to reduce its inci
dence. In April 1987, the Commission, known as the National Commission on Fraudulent Finan
cial Reporting, under the capable chairmanship of former SEC Commissioner James C. Treadway,
Jr., published a report for public comment which contains a series of proposed recommendations
to curb such practice. We applaud the Commission's diligent and practical consideration of the
complex issues of fraudulent financial reporting and generally support its recommendations.
We have provided written comments to the Commission on those recommendations that
directly or indirectly bear on the accounting profession's self-regulatory program:
■ Improving audit quality
■ Concurring partner review
■ Peer review
■ Regulation of the public accounting profession
■ Role of an audit committee vis-a-vis management advisory services by auditors
Our views on these matters are expressed in various sections of this report. A copy of our com
ment letter is reproduced as Exhibit II.
The Board is hopeful and optimistic that the proposals of the National Commission and
the Auditing Standards Board will be adopted, especially those that are designed to prevent audi
tors from accommodating "opinion shoppers" and those that will reduce the differences between
the responsibilities the accounting profession believes an auditor should have and the responsibili
ties that users of audited financial statements believe auditors should have.
The Board is also hopeful that the number of firms that subject their quality control sys
tems to peer review will continue to increase. Accordingly, as indicated, we support the manda
tory quality review recommendations of the Anderson Committee and the objective of the SEC's
proposal regarding mandatory peer review.

Conclusions

We believe the matters discussed in this report offer convincing evi
dence that peer regulation is effective. The Section deserves much
credit for the effective mechanisms it has put in place to test and moni
tor the professional accounting and auditing practices of member firms who must deal with and
help solve the myriad of complex problems created by the dynamic business world. As we have
said in the past, peer regulation is working and working well to maintain and improve the quality
of audit practice of firms that participate in this voluntary peer review program.

FOOTNOTES
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2.
3.
4.
5.

U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Fifty-Second Annual Report, 1986, p. 26.
Greene, Richard, "Blood on the Ledger," Forbes, May 18, 1987.
Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, Exposure Draft, April 1987.
Release 6695, Securities and Exchange Commission, April 1987.
"The Commission believes the peer review process contributes significantly to improving the quality control systems of member firms and thus
should enhance the consistency and quality of practice before the Commission." U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Fifty-Second Annual
Report, 1986, p. 25.
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POB Comment Letter on SEC Proposal for Mandatory Peer Reviews
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The Public Oversight Board is pleased to com
ment on the Commission's proposed amendments
to its rules that would require that financial state
ments included in filings with the Commission be
certified by an independent accountant who has
undergone a peer review of his/her accounting and
auditing practice within the last three years.
Since its inception in 1978, our Board has had the
unique opportunity of assessing the effects and
effectiveness of the peer review process by virtue of
monitoring the self-regulatory program of the SEC
Practice Section of the American Institute of Certi
fied Public Accountants. We have, in each of our
eight annual reports, unequivocally stated that the
peer review process has improved the quality of
audit practice of the Section's member firms.
Peer review is the most effective means available
to a profession to improve and maintain the quality
of service that its members provide. Our extensive
involvement with the program of the SEC Practice
Section has convinced us that it works and works
well at reasonable cost. SECPS member firms of all
sizes, from the largest to the smallest, have con
cluded that peer review has a positive cost/benefit
relationship and have heartily endorsed the program.
Thus, our Board strongly believes that the public
interest would be best served if all auditors, espe
cially those of public companies, were required to
undergo peer review periodically and to make the
improvements in their quality control systems that
a qualified peer reviewer considered necessary for
the firm to have reasonable assurance of complying
with professional standards in performing account
ing and auditing engagements. We have consistently
urged members of the profession to make this com
mitment voluntarily. We had hoped that the recent
proposal of the AICPA Board of Directors and Coun
cil would be adopted, which for practical purposes
would have caused virtually all firms with public
clients to join the SEC Practice Section and thus
would have helped accomplish this goal. Although
the proposal received a 61-percent favorable vote, we
were disappointed that it did not obtain the twothirds margin necessary for adoption.
Our Board unequivocally endorses the objective
of the Commission's mandatory peer review pro
posal, namely, "to enhance the quality of audits of
Commission registrants." However, we are con
cerned that the SECPS program, which has
functioned exceedingly well as an initiative of the
profession subject to oversight by our Board and
your staff, might be less effective if some of the rigid
rules in the proposal were adopted and literally
enforced.

Our major concerns relate to:
■ The role of the SEC
■ The need for confidentiality
■ The setting of peer review standards
■ The review of contested audits

The Role of the SEC
The public accounting profession is effectively
regulated at three distinct levels—by firms, by the
profession, and by government. While the objective
of each level is to assure reliable financial reporting,
each achieves its objective in a different way.
While we applaud the objective of the SEC's cur
rent proposal, we believe the proposal should be re
vised so that it will not materially alter the present
relationship between the accounting profession's
peer regulators and government regulators, a rela
tionship which has in the past decade developed and
matured, we believe, in a manner satisfactory to
everyone involved.
We therefore urge the Commission to make clear
that the Commission's relationship to a qualifying
peer review organization (PRO) will be to test the
effectiveness of the PRO's system of peer review,
including the role of its oversight body. Thus, each
PRO should be allowed the same degree of auton
omy that the SEC Practice Section now enjoys. Ex
perience with the SEC Practice Section's program
shows that the SEC does not need to have access to
all peer reviews administered by the PRO or to the
complete set of workpapers prepared by peer review
ers, as the proposal suggests. The Commission has
been able to satisfy itself as to the effectiveness of
the SECPS's peer review program by inspecting
selected workpapers of fewer than 25 percent of the
reviews performed in recent years. Indeed, the SEC's
discussion of the proposed rules acknowledges that
"the private sector approach currently embodied in
the SECPS and POB structure has proved both effec
tive and efficient."
The background section of the proposal states:
"fust as the Commission's previous conclusions
concerning the efficacy of the SECPS's program
have been reached without the review of all peer
review workpapers, it would usually not be neces
sary for the Commission to review all peer review
workpapers to judge the efficacy of a PRO's program
or its compliance with the Commission's require
ments." The proposed rules, however, establish the
Commission's right to access all peer review
workpapers but fail to support why that ever would
be necessary for the SEC to satisfy itself that the
program of a PRO is functioning properly.
The Board urges the Commission to extend to all
PROs the principle of testing the system that has

worked so well with its oversight of the peer review
program of the SECPS. Moreover, rather than the
rigid structure proposed in the rules, the Board sug
gests that the Commission enter into a memoran
dum of understanding with each qualifying PRO,
which should be available for public scrutiny, with
provisions similar to those included in the October
15, 1982 Memorandum of Understanding among the
SEC, SECPS, and the POB. Such a document should
contain provisions similar to those in that memo
randum, such as:
■ Establishment of the SEC's right to inspect
selected peer review workpapers of firms auditing
SEC registrants and the workpapers of the over
sight body.
■ Formalization of the timing of availability of
workpapers and reports.
■ Provision for confidentiality of certain data, such
as names of SEC registrants, personnel and offices
of reviewed firms, etc.
The Board agrees that a PRO should report imme
diately to the Office of the Chief Accountant when
ever a reviewed firm has a material quality control
deficiency and refuses to take corrective action.
Based on our oversight of the SECPS peer review
program, we are confident that this will rarely, if
ever, be necessary. Over the ten years during which
the AICPA program has been in existence, only one
firm refused to take the corrective action considered
necessary by the Section for the firm to have reason
able assurance of complying with professional stan
dards when performing accounting and auditing
engagements; that firm was expelled. However,
should such a situation eventuate in the future, the
Board believes that denial of the right of that auditor
to certify financial statements filed with the Com
mission would be appropriate.
The Board believes the SEC's relationship with
the program of the SEC Practice Section is consis
tent with the notion of self-regulation which the
SEC has publicly supported. Moreover, such an
approach is the only one that is likely to assure the
high degree of voluntary cooperation of firms that
the Board believes is essential for the operation of an
effective peer review program by a PRO.

The Need for Confidentiality
We believe one of the major reasons that the peer
review and special review programs of the SECPS
are effective is because they have evolved into pro
grams that strike a proper balance between protec
tion of the public and the rights and obligations of
the member firms. The confidential relationship
auditors have with their clients is essential for an
effective audit process; such a relationship is also
essential for an effective peer review process. The
SECPS's peer review process works well because it
protects this confidentiality. Peer review workpapers
made available to the staff of the Office of the Chief
Accountant do not identify SEC registrants (or even
the nonpublic clients), offices of multi-office firms,
individuals within firms except by title or position,

or firms that audit fewer than ten SEC registrants. If
these features are not retained, we sincerely believe
the peer review process would be considerably less
effective; the reviewed firms would be less candid
in responding to questions posed by the peer review
ers, and peer reviewers would be less inclined to
document detailed findings in peer review workpapers. Both these elements are essential for effec
tive monitoring of the program by the PRO's peer
review committee, its oversight board, and the staff
of the SEC.

The Setting of Peer Review Standards
If the proposal is adopted in its present form, the
SEC would establish peer review standards that
PROs would be expected to follow. However, we
believe that the Commission should look to the
private sector to establish quality control and peer
review standards, in much the same way as the
Commission looks to the private sector to establish
accounting and auditing standards. Moreover, a
relatively high degree of flexibility is needed if rules
are to be promptly adapted to a changing environ
ment; such flexibility is more easily attainable if
standards are set by a PRO than through the rulemaking procedures of the Commission.
The standards for performing and reporting the
results of peer reviews are not static. The standards
of the SECPS have been repeatedly revised as expe
rience has indicated the need for or the possibility
of improvement. At times, standards were revised
solely at the initiative of the Section, at other times
at the urging of the Board or the SEC.
The setting of standards or rules by the SEC
would materially alter the environment and stifle
the profession's initiative to make changes. There
fore, we urge the Commission not to publish peer
review rules, but instead (a) to publish guidance for
a PRO to follow in setting standards it expects its
reviewers and members to follow, and (b) to require
a PRO in order to be recognized as a qualifying PRO
to establish and enforce peer review standards that
are acceptable to the Commission.
If the SEC adopts rules as proposed, the Commis
sion would have line responsibility and control over
each PRO and its board. We do not believe that this
would be in the best interests of the profession, the
public, or the SEC. We do not believe that appoint
ments of members of a PRO's oversight board
should require SEC's concurrence. If this were done,
the board would not be perceived as independent
but rather would be seen as an arm of the Commis
sion. Such a perception could adversely affect the
working relationships that a board needs to perform
its oversight role effectively. Such a change would be
in sharp contrast to the efficient and effectively
operative self-regulatory process that the Commis
sion has found to be wholly satisfactory over the
years in dealing with the SEC Practice Section and
our Board.
We strongly believe a board should be truly indepen
dent with respect to both the profession and the Com
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mission if it is to be effective and have credibility.
T h e R ev iew o f C on tested A udits
A peer reviewer is charged with the responsibility
of reviewing each engagement selected for review in
sufficient depth to be able to conclude whether the
engagement was or was not performed in all mate
rial respects in accordance with professional stan
dards. In addition, largely at our urging, peer review
teams of the SEC Practice Section are required to
consider all litigation, proceedings, or investigations
involving SEC registrants initiated since the firm's
prior peer review in setting the scope of that firm's
peer review—in deciding which offices, audit areas,
clients in specified industries, and engagement per
sonnel are to be subjected to review.
However, while we believe it is entirely appropri
ate that peer review teams judge each engagement
reviewed as to whether it was performed in accord
ance with professional standards, we believe it is
inappropriate to require such judgment to be made
concerning the performance of an audit that is being
litigated. The judicial process, which has access to
all relevant facts through its subpoena powers and
safeguards the rights of both plaintiff and defendant,
is the only appropriate forum where contested audits
should be resolved. Consequently, we believe that
the right of a firm to deny full access to contested
audits, to either a peer reviewer or a special investi
gator outside the judicial process, is reasonable in
the light of the insurance crisis, the litigious cli
mate, the high cost in terms of time and money in
defending oneself in a court trial or government
proceeding, and the magnitude of monetary dam
ages against auditors awarded by some judges and
juries.
Nevertheless, our Board believes that a PRO
should have a program to deal with the quality con
trol implications of contested audits. We believe
that this should be a separate supplemental program
and not an integral part of the peer review program.
The consideration of contested audits by a PRO in a
special investigative process rather than the peer
review process has several advantages:
■ Quality control deficiencies that may be inferred
from allegations of contested audits would receive
immediate attention rather than be deferred until
that firm's next peer review, which could in some
cases be in excess of two years later.
■ A standing committee of highly experienced prac
titioners is more likely to be objective in evaluat
ing the quality control implications of the allega
tions made in litigation than a review team that
may have previously opined on the quality con
trols of the firm.

■ A standing committee that reviews all contested
audits of all member firms belonging to a PRO is
better able to assess whether professional stand
ards should be reevaluated or whether professional
guidance in the application of standards is ade
quate.
The objective of the special review program of a
PRO should not be to determine whether a con
tested audit has or has not been performed in
accordance with professional standards. Conse
quently, we believe that those charged with the
responsibility for the special investigative program
should not and need not have access to the full set
of workpapers of contested audits. We support the
concept that "special investigators," when appro
priate, should be expected to request and be given
access to documentation that will permit them to
make a judgment quickly and efficiently as to
whether a firm's quality control system is appropri
ately designed and is being complied with.
We recognize, however, that in rare cases, where
the potential monetary damages are relatively large,
a firm may not want to risk granting access to even
a portion of the workpapers prepared during the
course of performing a contested audit. In such
cases, it is expected that refusal by a firm to grant
access to the requested documentation will materi
ally increase the likelihood that the special investi
gators may need to order a special review in order to
gain the requisite assurance that the firm's quality
control system provides it with reasonable assurance
of complying with professional standards in the
performance of future engagements.
The Board believes that the four-phased approach
for the operation of the special investigative or
review process recently recommended by the SECPS
Task Force on SIC Methodology and adopted in
April 1987 by the Section is an appropriate model
for the special review process of a PRO. We recom
mend that the SEC require each qualifying PRO to
have a similar process.
In conclusion, we strongly favor mandatory peer
review for an auditor of an SEC registrant rather
than proxy statement disclosure by the registrant as
to whether its auditor has subjected his/her quality
control system to peer review. Should the Commis
sion decide not to require auditors of SEC registrants
to belong to a PRO acceptable to the Commission, the
Board would support such a disclosure requirement.
We shall be pleased to meet with the Commission
to clarify any of the matters discussed in this letter.
June 29, 1987

Exhibit II
POB Comment Letter on Draft Report of National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
The Public Oversight Board is pleased to com
ment on the Commission's draft report entitled
R eport o f the N ation al C om m ission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting. While our paramount responsi
bility is to oversee the voluntary self-regulatory
programs of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA,
we have a keen interest in all initiatives to improve
the quality of audit practice and financial reporting.
We applaud the Commission's diligent and prac
tical consideration of the complex issues of fraudu
lent financial reporting. We generally support all of
the Commission's recommendations and appreciate
the fact that the report incorporates the views we
expressed in our meeting with the Commission.
From its inception in 1978, the Board has had a
unique opportunity to assess the effects of the selfregulatory programs of the SEC Practice Section on
quality of audit practice. While the individual mem
bers of the Board may wish to submit personal com
ments on other aspects of the draft report, this com
mentary will be limited to those aspects of the
report that directly or indirectly bear on the
accounting profession's self-regulatory program:
■ Improving Audit Quality
■ Concurring Partner Review
■ Peer Review
■ Regulation of the Public Accounting Profession
■ Role of the Audit Committee vis-a-vis
Management Advisory Services by Auditors

Improving Audit Quality
Our Board agrees that elimination of fraudulent
financial reporting requires concerted action of all
parties involved in the financial reporting process
and that the roles of the reporting entity and the
audit committee are crucial. The auditing profession
also has an important role to play, and, in our view,
has not thus far accepted the degree of responsibility
that it should have for requiring that the scope of an
audit be expanded to detect instances of fraudulent
financial reporting not accompanied by collusive
acts of management and/or employees.
We are pleased to note the profession's current
initiatives in this regard. Adoption of the revisions
to auditing standards currently being proposed by
the Auditing Standards Board will require auditors
to expand the scope of the audit to increase the
likelihood of detecting major errors and irregulari
ties and to evaluate the effectiveness of the client's
internal controls.

Concurring Partner Review
The Board believes that review of an audit engage
ment by a partner in addition to the engagement
partner can provide a firm with significant addi
tional assurance that its engagements are performed
in all material respects in accordance with profes

sional standards. It should be noted, however, that
concurring partner review is now required only for
audits of SEC registrants performed by firms that
are members of the SEC Practice Section. Neither
generally accepted auditing standards nor quality
control standards require that audits be subjected to
concurring partner review. Moreover, the concurring
partner review membership requirement has only
recently been strengthened by the SEC Practice
Section—in large part at our urging—to require
that certain workpapers as well as the audit report
and financial statements be subjected to review by
the second partner. The effectiveness of the imple
mentation of the expanded requirement will be first
tested in peer reviews conducted in 1987.
A meeting in May 1987 with representatives of
the Section's Peer Review and Special Investigations
Committees disclosed differences among CPA firms
as to additional assurance that a concurring partner
review can and should provide and the responsibil
ity that the concurring reviewer is or should be
assigned. We were advised that such differences
exist even among the large national firms and that
very few firms charge a concurring reviewer with
the responsibility for doing a sufficiently compre
hensive review so as to provide the firm with addi
tional assurance that the audit was conducted in a
manner that would reasonably ensure detection of
fraudulent financial reporting.
The Board is concerned about the differences that
exist regarding the degree of assurance that a con
curring partner review should provide. We are
aware, however, of the difficulty of specifying proce
dures that all firms should require of their concur
ring review partners in view of the widely varying
methods firms use in documenting the results of
auditing procedures performed.
The Board believes the Commission's recommen
dations regarding concurring review have merit and
should be required to be applied by all auditing
firms, at minimum to audits of clients of public
companies or of clients in high-risk industries. The
Commission might well consider recommending
that the Auditing Standards Board incorporate con
curring partner review as part of quality control
standards or, at minimum, issue guidance as to
when an audit engagement should be subjected to
concurring review.

Peer Review
Peer review, the keystone of the accounting pro
fession's self-regulatory program, has undeniably
improved the quality of audit practice and is the
most effective means available to the accounting
profession to improve the quality of service that its
members provide.
The Section has revised its peer review program
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whenever experience indicated the need for or a
possibility of improvement. One such recent revi
sion will cause reviewers to (a) obtain a list of SEC
engagements accepted since the last peer review
where, as reported in a Form 8-K or similar public
filing, the former auditor resigned or there was a
disagreement on a reporting matter between man
agement and the auditor, and (b) ascertain whether
the firm rendered an opinion on the application of
generally accepted accounting principles prior to
accepting the registrant as an audit client and, if so,
whether such opinion was issued in accordance
with the firm's procedures.
In addition, peer reviewers are required to review
current and prior period workpapers to the extent
necessary to evaluate whether any matters which
led to resignation of the predecessor auditor or
which were the subject of disagreement between
the predecessor auditor and management were han
dled appropriately by the successor auditor. We
believe these procedures will be effective in detect
ing situations where the successor auditor accom
modated "an opinion shopper." We are satisfied that
compliance with the recently adopted auditing
standard regarding opinion shopping can be ade
quately tested in the peer review process. Therefore,
we do not consider it necessary that peer reviewers
be required to review all new client engagements.

Regulation of the Public Accounting Profession
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Our Board strongly believes that the public inter
est would be best served if all auditors, especially
those of public companies, were required to undergo
peer review periodically and to make those improve
ments in their quality control systems considered
necessary to provide reasonable assurance of com
plying with professional standards in performing
accounting and auditing engagements. Accordingly,
we endorse the current proposal of the Securities
and Exchange Commission that each registrant's
financial statements be audited by an auditor that
belongs to a peer review organization acceptable to
the SEC. Our Board supports denial of an auditor's
right to certify financial statements filed with the
Commission if his/her firm has a material quality
control deficiency and refuses to take corrective
action.
However, we are concerned that the peer review
program of the SEC Practice Section, which has
functioned exceedingly well as an initiative of the
profession and is subject to effective oversight by
our Board and the SEC, might be less effective if the
rigid rules in the SEC's proposal where adopted and
strictly enforced. Our Board believes the SEC's
present relationship with the SEC Practice Section
is consistent with the notion of self-regulation
which your Commission embraces and the SEC has
publicly supported. Moreover, the present approach
will continue to assure the high degree of coopera
tion by firms that the Board believes is essential for
the operation of an effective peer review program.
The SEC should not have the right to exercise line

authority over any peer review organization; its role
should be one of active oversight. As your Commis
sion recommends, we fully agree that "... the SEC
should continue to monitor and maintain liaisons
with the public accounting profession's quality
assurance program."
We have expressed these views to the Securities
and Exchange Commission. A copy of our letter to
the Commission is attached for your consideration.

Role of the Audit Committee Vis-a-vis
Management Advisory Services by Auditors
In November 1986, our Board published results of
a survey it authorized a professional research organi
zation to conduct entitled, P ublic Perceptions o f
M anagem en t A dvisory Services P erform ed by CPA
Firm s for A udit C lients. While no instance of
impaired auditor independence or objectivity attrib
utable to the rendition of advisory services has ever
come to our attention, the Board authorized the
research study because it is concerned that the con
tinuous expansion of consulting services by CPA
firms may be perceived as impairing auditor inde
pendence and thus could adversely affect the value
of the audit function over time.
The survey indicated that key public groups per
ceive certain types of MAS as impairing auditor
objectivity and independence. In distributing the
research report, the Board noted that the survey was
not authorized or intended to be used as a basis for
POB action. It was intended to be used by the profes
sion to decide what action, if any, the profession
should take to change the perceptions of various
groups which either use audited financial state
ments or have a high interest and concern with
them. The Board is pleased to note that the SEC
Practice Section has formed a task force to consider
the implications of the perceptions reported in the
Board's survey.
We also intend to suggest in our upcoming annual
report that the information contained in the
research report be used by firms in developing poli
cies for the rendition of advisory services and to
companies in dealing with these matters. In that
regard, we support the Commission's recommenda
tion that an audit committee should adopt a policy
of reviewing management's evaluation of factors
related to the independence of the company's audi
tor and approving in advance the types and extent of
management advisory services that management
plans to engage the company's auditing firm to
perform.
Our Board commends the Commission for its thor
ough investigation of the nature and causes of fraud
ulent financial reporting and its meaningful recom
mendations for eliminating, or at minimum
significantly reducing, the incidence of fraudulent
financial reporting. We shall be pleased to meet
with the Commission to clarify any of the matters
discussed in this letter.
June 30, 1987
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The quality of services of a CPA firm is dependent
in large part on its system of quality control. In
1979, the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants issued quality control standards applic
able to the conduct of an accounting and auditing
practice. Each firm that is a member of the Division
for CPA Firms is required to establish quality con
trol policies and procedures that provide the firm
with reasonable assurance that its accounting and
auditing engagements will be performed in accor
dance with professional standards— i.e., generally
accepted accounting principles and generally
accepted auditing standards.
While generally accepted auditing standards
relate to the conduct of individual audit engage
ments, quality control standards relate to the con
duct of a firm's audit practice as a whole. A system
of quality control for a CPA firm consists of nine
elements: independence, acceptance and continu
ance of clients, hiring, assignment of personnel to
engagements, supervision, consultation, profes
sional development, advancement, and inspection.
Peer review—the cornerstone of the accounting
profession's self-regulatory program—is the process
by which the design of and compliance with a CPA
firm's quality control system for its accounting and
auditing practice is examined, evaluated, and pub
licly reported on, by a team of qualified, experi
enced, and independent CPAs from one or more
other firms. Firms that are members of the Division
for CPA Firms must undergo a peer review of their
accounting and auditing practice at least once every
three years.1This discussion, however, is limited to
the peer review program of the SEC Practice Section.
A peer review consists of the following:
■ An evaluation of the appropriateness of the design
of the firm's quality control system in the light of
the firm's accounting and auditing practice.
■ A variety of tests for compliance by its personnel
with the firm's quality control policies and proce
dures at each organizational or functional level
within the firm.
■ Review of a representative sample of accounting
and audit engagements, including audit and
other reports, financial statements, and relevant
workpaper files to ascertain whether they were
performed or prepared in conformity with
professional standards and the firm's policies and
procedures.
■ Tests for compliance with other membership
requirements of the Section, some of which are
mandatory quality control policies and procedures
above and beyond current professional standards.

■ Expression of a written opinion on the design of
the firm's quality control system and the level of
compliance by the firm's personnel with its qual
ity control policies and procedures and the Sec
tion's membership requirements.
The Section has developed and published stan
dards and extensive guidance to assist review teams
in conducting and reporting on peer reviews.

1986 Reviews
In 1986, 127 SECPS member firms had their qual
ity control systems peer reviewed— 14 for the first
time, 18 for the second time, 93 for the third time,
and 2 for the fourth time.
Six of these were "accelerated reviews"— i.e.,
reviews the Peer Review Committee required the
firms to undergo prior to the expiration of the nor
mal three-year cycle because their prior review had
disclosed significant quality control deficiencies
requiring extensive corrective actions. All six firms
had previously received modified reports. Four of
the firms received unqualified reports on their 1986
reviews. Two firms received another modified report
because their quality control systems still needed
significant improvement.
As of June 30, 1987, the Peer Review Committee
had accepted 111 reports on member firms' 1986
peer reviews. Acceptance of reports on the remain
ing 16 reviews had been deferred pending resolution
of various significant matters.

Types of Reports Issued
After performing its review of the firm's quality
control system and testing compliance by firm per
sonnel with that system and with the Section's
membership requirements, a peer review team sum
marizes its findings and conclusions in a formal
report, usually accompanied by a letter of com
ments. The review team may express an unquali
fied, qualified, or adverse opinion on the reviewed
firm's quality control system. Strict adherence to
the reporting standards delineated in the SECPS
Manual is enforced by the Section's Peer Review
Committee.
In 1986, 115 or 91% of the firms reviewed
received unqualified opinions, 105 of which were
accompanied by letters of comments. Twelve firms,
or 9% , received qualified reports and letters of com
ments. Reports on reviews completed in 1986 are
classified by type of report accepted by the Peer
Review Committee or, for the 16 reports not yet
processed by the Committee, based on a preliminary
evaluation made by the Committee's and POB's
staffs of the peer review teams' findings. Since
inception of the program, about 950 SECPS peer
reviews have been performed; 88% of the reports
issued have been unqualified, 10% qualified, and
2% adverse.
While improvement in the quality of accounting
and auditing of member firms cannot be precisely
measured, it is clear that improvement is occurring.
See discussion of "Improvements in Quality of Prac
tice" on page 12 of the Board's report.

The Committee and its staff continue to enforce
peer review standards vigorously and equitably
often not accepting the review team's report as origi
nally submitted. In 1986, the Committee initially
rejected 19 reports— 15% of the total. The primary
reasons for rejection were:
■ The report and/or letter of comments issued were
not appropriate in light of the deficiencies noted
during the review; in these cases, the review
teams were required to change the report and/or
letter of comments.
■ The review team did not test a representative or
sufficient number of accounting and auditing
engagements; in these cases, review teams were
required to return to the firm and review addi
tional engagements.
■ Major disagreements between the review team
and reviewed firm had not been resolved; in these
cases, a Committee member was appointed to
review the findings, discuss the matter with both
parties, and recommend a course of action to the
Committee. In each case, the matter was ulti
mately resolved to the satisfaction of all parties.

statements to be corrected in subsequent year by
restating the prior year, (c) perform the additional
audit procedures considered necessary by generally
accepted auditing standards, or (d) eliminate cause
of impairment of independence.
If the firm does not concur with the review team's
opinion that the engagement is substandard, the
matter is reported immediately to the Committee
for resolution. If the firm and the Committee cannot
resolve the matter to their mutual satisfaction, the
firm is required to report the matter to the Profes
sional Ethics Division for resolution and to advise
the Committee of the actions taken as a result
thereof.
The number of engagements evaluated by review
teams as substandard has decreased in each of the
past three years, another indication that the process
is improving the quality of practice of the member
firms. Details are shown in the accompanying table.
During 1986, review teams reviewed the reports,
financial statements, and supporting workpapers of
1,285 audit engagements, 327 of which were audits
of SEC registrants. Review teams found 12 engage-

A udit Engagem ents E valuated as Substandard by P eer R eview Teams
Peer Review Year
1983

1984

1985

1986

N u m b er of F irm s R e v ie w e d ...........................................

144

167

80

127

N u m b er of A udit E n gag em en ts R eview ed ...........

1315

1162

657

1285

N u m b er of E n gag em en ts E valu ated as
Substandard ........................................................................

33

19

5

12

P ercen t of A u d it E n gag em en ts R eview ed and
E valu ated as Substandard ...........................................

2 .5 %

0 .8 %

0 .9 %

N u m b er of F irm s P erform in g E ngagem ents
C onsidered S ubstandard .............................................

16

4

10

Substandard Performance on Individual
Engagements
Peer review teams assess the workpaper evidence
for each engagement reviewed to ascertain whether
the engagement was performed in conformity with
professional standards. An engagement is considered
substandard when, in the opinion of the review
team, the financial statements were incorrectly
reported to be in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles in all material
respects, or when the auditing firm had not per
formed sufficient procedures to support the opinion
it expressed.
Each substandard engagement discovered in the
course of a review is required to be reported to an
appropriate authority within the reviewed firm and
addressed by the firm immediately.
If the firm agrees with the review team's conclu
sion, it is required to (a) withdraw its opinion if the
financial statements are considered not to have
been prepared in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles, (b) cause financial

1.6%
10

ments, or 0.9% of the number reviewed, that they
considered to be substandard in the application of
generally accepted accounting principles or gener
ally accepted auditing standards; 4 were audits of
SEC registrants.

Monitoring of Corrective Actions Required of
Firms Reviewed in 1986
Representatives of two member firms were re
quired to meet with the Committee to discuss the
quality control deficiencies noted in their peer re
views and to report on the corrective actions they
had initiated. In each case, the Committee im 
pressed upon the firm representatives, who were
either members of top management or had responsi
bility for the firm's quality control system, the need
for strong and timely implementation of corrective
action plans. In addition, one firm voluntarily met
with the Committee to report the changes it had
made to its quality control policies and procedures
and the results obtained therefrom. The Committee
is actively monitoring the results of the corrective
actions of each of these firms.
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Corrective Actions Required with Respect to
Substandard Engagements Identified in Peer
Reviews Performed in 1986

SEC
Non-SEC
Engagements Engagements

Audit report recalled and
financial statements/audit
report revised and reissued . . .
Financial statements corrected
in subsequent year by restating
the prior year ..............................
Omitted auditing procedures
perform ed.....................................
Cause of impairment of
independence elim inated.........

30

0

3

0

3

2

2

2

0

In each instance where significant quality control
deficiencies were detected during the peer review,
including some not serious enough to call for a
modified report, the Committee required the
reviewed firm to provide assurance that an
appropriate corrective action plan had been
effectively implemented. Such assurance was
required of 21 of the 111 firms reviewed in 1986
whose reports have been accepted by the
Committee.
Assurance was requested in various forms, such
as requiring a firm to:
■ Undergo a full scope peer review within one year.
■ Permit the team captain to evaluate revisions of
the quality control system to test compliance
with the revised policies and procedures to assess
the effectiveness of corrective actions.
■ Submit copies of the inspection report for the
following year.
■ Permit the team captain to review the planned
scope of the firm's next inspection and monitor
its performance.
■ Permit the team captain to review major revisions
to the firm's quality control document and report
the results of such review to the Committee.
■ Develop and submit copy of detailed corrective
action plan and submit quarterly reports to the
Committee on the status of the implementation
of the plan.

Monitoring of Corrective Actions Required of
Firms Reviewed in 1985
At June 30, 1986, the reports on reviews
performed in 1985 of five firms had not been
accepted by the Committee, pending satisfactory
resolution of certain matters by the reviewed firms.
All five reports have since been accepted by the
Committee. The Committee required those firms
with serious quality control deficiencies to provide
assurance that the causes of the deficiencies had
been corrected. Assurance measures included:
■ Requiring one firm:

□ to submit to a full scope peer review in 1987,

□ to continue to employ consultants to perform
preissuance reviews of the financial statements,
audit reports, and supporting workpapers on all
audit engagements,
□ to employ consultants to design and make operative
an appropriate quality control system, and
□ to submit its internal inspection reports for
evaluation by the Committee.
■ Requiring one firm:

□ to have its peer review team test and report on the
effectiveness of selected revised quality control
policies and procedures, and
□ to submit its internal inspection reports for
evaluation by the Committee.
■ Requiring one firm to submit its internal
inspection reports for evaluation by the
Committee.
Every member firm made or agreed to make the
changes in its quality control system deemed neces
sary by the review team (and/or by the Committee)
and none refused to provide the information the
Committee requested evidencing that appropriate
and effective corrective actions had been taken.
Both small and large firms have had to provide the
Committee with such evidence. At June 30, 1987,
the Committee continued to monitor the effective
ness of revisions to the quality control systems of
firms in the following size ranges:
Number of
Professionals

Number
of Firms

1 - 10
11-100

12

Over 100

5

9

Modification of Peer Review Standards and
Procedures
Peer review standards are revised whenever
experience suggests they can be made more effec
tive or efficient or whenever additional member
ship requirements are enacted. During the past
year, as reported on page 20 of the Board's report,
standards were adopted to address concerns about
"opinion shopping."
Additionally, the Committee adopted as a peer
review standard a procedure that had been infor
mally applied in prior years. Upon identification of a
substandard engagement during the course of a peer
review, the review team must now consider the
advisability of extending the scope of the review to
other engagements to determine if the substandard
work is indicative of a pattern of performance or an
aberration. The additional procedures could include
the review of additional engagements supervised by
the same partner, other engagements in the same
industry, or engagements with characteristics sim i
lar to those present in the substandard engagement.

In 1986, the Peer Review Committees of both
sections revised the standards for performing and
reporting peer reviews, significantly revised the
forms, checklists, and questionnaires used in
performing peer reviews, and issued a new guide
entitled “Suggestions for Writing Letters of Com
ments." Such guidance is expected to effect
greater uniformity in both the form and content
of such letters in the future. In addition, review
team captains were required to attend an all-day
training program involving the above changes
prior to performing peer reviews after August 1,
1986. The training material focused on identify
ing systemic deficiencies in quality controls.

Other Activities
In November 1986, the Committee met with
the SEC Chief Accountant and members of his
staff to discuss the effectiveness of modifications
made in the peer review program during the year.
Members of the Committee and its staff also met
with representatives of the Auditing Standards
Board and Financial Accounting Standards Board
to discuss practice problems that review teams en
countered when performing this year's peer reviews.

Monitoring of MAS Engagements
The Section's membership requirements pro
scribe member firms from performing certain
types of management advisory services for SEC
registrants whose financial statements the firm
audits. Peer review teams review both the audit
and MAS engagements performed for selected
SEC clients to ascertain that (a) the MAS engage
ment was not one proscribed by the Section, (b)
the firm did not impair its independence by per
forming the MAS engagement— i.e., by acting
either in a decision-making role or as an
employee—and (c) all major decisions made dur
ing the course of performing the audit were objec
tive. Particular emphasis was placed on clients
where the fees for MAS equalled or exceeded the
audit fee.
No instance was uncovered of violation of
membership rules or impairment of independence
and objectivity.

SEC Oversight of the Process
The SEC, through the Office of the Chief
Accountant, has access to a sample of randomlyselected peer review workpapers, to POB workpa
pers on all reviews, and to all documents in the
Section's public file. This is necessary so the SEC
can make an independent evaluation of the effec
tiveness of the process. The SEC staff has substan
tially completed its inspection of the 1986
reviews; however, certain reviews in its sample of
review team workpapers selected are not yet avail

able because the reports have not yet been
accepted by the Committee. The SEC staff has
indicated that it is satisfied with both peer review
and oversight performance on the reviews
inspected to date.
In its annual report for 1986, as it has done in
previous years, the SEC opined favorably on the
process: “The Commission believes the peer review
process contributes significantly to improving the
quality control systems of member firms and
thus should enhance the consistency and quality
of practice before the Commission." 2 This convic
tion has led the SEC to propose a rule for public
comment that would require auditors who prac
tice before the Commission to undergo triennial
peer review by an approved peer review organiza
tion (PRO) or by qualified reviewers under direct
SEC supervision. According to that proposal, the
Section and the POB would constitute such a
PRO. The SEC observed in the background text of
the proposal that: “The private sector approach
currently embodied in the SECPS and POB struc
ture has proved both effective and efficient..." 3

Benefits of Peer Review
Participants in the peer review program gener
ally indicate that it is beneficial, as noted in the
following news item that appeared in the June
1987 issue of the Journal o f A ccou n tan cy:
“CPA Firms Report More Attention Paid to
Quality. Of those accounting firms that are
members of the Division for CPA firms of the
American Institute of CPAs, 53% spend more
time on quality control matters than they
would if they were not required to do so in
order to maintain membership, according to
recent results of an AICPA survey. Of those
surveyed, 94% reported that their peer review
uncovered areas which they “really need to
improve" and that needed changes were made.
Of the respondents, 47% said that division
membership can help a small firm hold exist
ing clients and obtain new ones; 79% devel
oped a quality control document because none
previously existed; 47% sent personnel to
training programs on quality control or peer
review; and 64% said that a successful peer
review helps in recruiting staff."
FOOTNOTES
1. The Private Companies Practice Section has a peer review program
which for all intents and purposes is identical with the SEC Practice
Section's program, except that it is not subject to oversight by a public
board.
2. 53nd Annual Report of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the Fiscal Year Ended September 30, 1986, p. 25.
3. Securities Act of 1933 Release 6695, p. 48.
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Appendix B
Special
Investigative
Activities
The mission of the Special Investigations Commit
tee (SIC) formed in November 1979 is to determine
whether allegations of audit failure of a publiclyheld client made against an SECPS member firm
indicate the need for corrected measures by the
member firm, and to obtain assurance that the
member firm makes any modifications considered
necessary. Of equal importance is the Committee's
evaluation of whether professional standards and
related guidance are adequate in the light of a spe
cific or a series of alleged audit failures. The Com
mittee's focus is on the future; therefore, the Com
mittee's mission is not to decide whether the audit
failure alleged to have occurred has in fact occurred.
Nor is it the Committee's objective to discipline a
firm or specific individuals for inadequate perfor
mance on a given engagement.
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C ases R e p o r te d
Member firms reported 44 cases to the SIC during
the year ended June 30, 1987. In addition, the Com
mittee reopened its files on two previously closed
cases to consider whether actions taken by a regula
tory agency against the firm or specified individuals
had quality control implications not considered by
the Committee in its initial evaluation.
In total, the Committee worked on 79 cases dur
ing the year. Task forces consisting of one or two
SIC members were assigned to all cases to evaluate
the quality control implications of the allegations.
The files on 50 cases were closed based upon the
evaluation of the information gathered by task
forces and Committee staff. A case file is closed
only after the task force (and Committee) has gath
ered and evaluated sufficient information to con
clude that the firm has taken the corrective action
deemed necessary by the Committee; in some
cases, the Committee obtains added assurance by
reviewing the results of the firm's next peer review.1
Files on ten of the cases were closed only after the
Committee had reviewed the findings of either a
special review or a peer review in which the scope
and procedures for review of portions of the firm's
quality control system were specified by an SIC
task force.
S p ecial R ev iew s
Based upon its analysis of information obtained
from discussions with firm representatives and
their peer reviewers, the Committee required two
firms to submit to special reviews during 1986-87.
Those two firms accounted for five of the ten cases
referred to in the preceding paragraph.

R ev iew o f Firm A : Firm A was the subject of
litigation that involved audits performed by person
nel in one of its offices.
Prior to the commencement of the special review,
the firm had assigned a team of competent inspec
tors from several other offices of the firm to perform
an intensive review (inspection) of that office, which
encompassed a significant number of audit engage
ments, including engagements performed by the
engagement supervisory personnel involved in the
litigation. After evaluating the findings of its inspec
tion team, the firm took the following actions:
■ Assigned a new director of auditing in that office.
■ Reassessed the competence of a number of experi
enced personnel and reassigned certain audit
engagement responsibilities.
■ Required all audit engagements to be subjected to
an additional level of review (concurring partner
review).
■ Required all personnel in that office to attend
training programs dealing with audit work consid
ered deficient by the inspection team.
Even though the firm reported these findings and
actions to the Committee, the Committee ordered a
special review by a member of the SIC.
The assigned member visited the office, inter
viewed key personnel, reviewed the detailed find
ings of the firm's inspection team and resultant
corrective action plan, reviewed a sample of audit
engagements performed subsequent to the imple
mentation of the corrective actions by personnel
involved in the litigation, discussed appropriate
matters with firm personnel, and evaluated whether
the corrective actions produced the desired results.
Based upon the assigned member's conclusion that
the firm had taken appropriate and effective correc
tive actions, the Committee closed its files on the
cases involving that office of the firm.
R ev iew o f Firm B: Firm B was required to
undergo a special review after the assigned SIC task
force had ascertained (a) that the firm's quality con
trol policies and procedures did not provide guid
ance to its personnel when using non-supervisory
personnel of another firm to perform extensive
auditing procedures and (b) that the firm had used
personnel of other firms on several other engage
ments in circumstances in which the other firm
was not independent.
Accordingly, by order of the Committee and under
the direction and supervision of the assigned SIC
task force, personnel drawn from other offices of the
firm reviewed all engagements wherein non-firm
personnel performed extensive audit procedures and
a sample of other engagements supervised by the
partner who had supervised the allegedly faulty
audit. As a result of such review, the firm deter
mined that additional auditing procedures were
necessary to support the firm's opinion on the
majority of these engagements. Those procedures
were immediately performed.

Depth of Inquiries Made by SIC Task Forces to Gain Assurance Regarding Adequacy of and Compliance with Firm’s
Quality Control System Prior to Closing Files on 50 Cases During 1986-87

Analysis of
Allegations

General
Inquiries

In-Depth
Inquiries

Read complaint,
relevant financial
statements, and
all other publicly
available relevant
materials.

Discuss issues
addressed by
allegations that
have quality
control implica
tions with repre
sentatives of the
firm or its peer
reviewers and, if
appropriate,
examine peer
review and
inspection
results.

Discuss relevant
quality control
policies and
procedures and
compliance there
with with firm
personnel familiar
with the case,
review firm’s
technical man
uals, guidance
materials and,
when appropriate,
audit documenta
tion prepared in
the performance
of the audit in
question.

50
Case Files

Review of
Quality
Control
System
of Firm
Review relevant
aspects of firm’s
quality control
policies and
procedures and
compliance
therewith.
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14

18

8

Case Files

Case Files

Case Files

(28%)

(36%)

(16%)

In addition, the financial statements issued by
one client and reported on by the firm were found to
be in error (the error was not related to the use of
non-firm personnel.) This engagement was per

formed by an office other than the office which
performed the allegedly faulty audit reported to the
SIC. It was concluded that the report and financials
need not be recalled since the following year's state

ments were soon to be published and the financials
of the year in question would then be restated. The
firm ordered that concurring reviews be performed
by partners of another office on all engagements
supervised by personnel of the office which issued
the erroneous report.
The firm, as a direct result of this special review,
also developed and distributed a policy statement
and instructions regarding assignment of audit pro
cedures to non-firm personnel.
A member of the task force tested and evaluated
the effectiveness of the firm's internal review, its
findings, and corrective actions. The member
reported that the firm had made appropriate
changes in its quality control policy and procedures
and had taken appropriate actions concerning
engagements that were considered to be substand
ard. The Committee closed its file on the case but
decided to review the results of the firm's next peer
review.

S tan d ard R ev iew P roced u res on O ther C ases
For each reported case, a task force of one or two
Committee members studies the complaints, rele
vant financial statements, and other available public
documents, and considers whether allegations, if
sustained, suggest a deficiency in the firm's quality
control system.
As indicated, case files were closed only after
special reviews had been performed; or the Commit
tee reviewed did not lead it to conclude that the firms
did not need to take corrective actions in addition to
those that might have already been implemented.
The diligence of the Committee in discharging its
responsibilities is evidenced by the fact that its task
forces held a total of 60 meetings during the year
with firm representatives; the firm's peer review
team captain was in attendance at 11 of these
meetings.

Special Investigations Committee Activity During the Year Ending June 30, 1987
Activity Relating to Quality Control Systems of Firms Reporting Cases
Files of open cases at July 1, 1 9 8 6 .....................................................................................................................................................................3 3
N ew cases rep orted by firm s d uring the y e a r .............................................................................................................................................4 4
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C ase files reopened b ecau se of developm ents o c c u rrin g after files were closed

..................................................................... 2

C ases acted on by C o m m itte e during y e a r ..................................................................................................................................................79
C ase files closed after:
E valu ation of th e resu lts of a sp ecial review or of sp ecific procedures perform ed at its req u est in a
tim ely review of th e f i r m * ........................................................................................................................................................10
E valu ation of relevant q u ality co n tro l m a te ria ls of th e firm , su ch as te c h n ic a l m an u als and
gu id ance m a te ria ls, or th e resu lts of in tern al review s or in s p e c tio n s ............................................................. 26
C o n clu d in g th a t th e allegation s had no q u ality co n tro l im p lication s or were based on a
m isu n d erstan d in g of professional s t a n d a r d s ................................................................................................................14
C ase files closed d uring y e a r ................................................................................................................................................................................5 0
Files of open cases at June 3 0 , 1 9 8 7

................................................................................................................................................................ 29

Activity Relating to Review of Professional Standards
■ T h e A u d itin g Stan dards Board w as asked to address th e adequacy of guidance regarding:
□ T h e degree to w h ich a firm m u st su p ervise th e p erform an ce of auditin g procedures to be perform ed by
personnel of an o th er a cco u n tin g firm .
□ R elian ce on opin ion s of n o n -acco u n tin g sp ecialists, esp ecially real e state appraisers.
□ A u d itin g of in v e stm e n ts in u n con solid ated affiliates n ot separately reported on.
□ R eliab ility of co n firm atio n s as ev id en tiary m atter.
□ A u d itin g of deferred start-u p co sts.
■ T h e A cco u n tin g S tan dards E xecu tiv e C o m m itte e w as asked to review professional literatu re co n cern in g :
□ D isclo su res of risks and u n ce rta in tie s.
□ D eferral of start-u p c o sts.
□ A cq u isition , developm ent, and co n stru ctio n loans.
■ T h e Peer R eview C o m m itte e w as asked to issue gu id ance to peer review ers to give additional w eight in
selectin g en g ag em en ts to th ose w here personnel of an o th er a cco u n tin g firm w as used to p erform su b stan tial
auditin g procedures.
* The SIC frequently monitors the effectiveness of corrective actions instituted as a result of a special review by reviewing the results of the
firm's next review. For example, during the year another task force evaluated the findings and reports of a peer review performed in 1986
on a firm that had a special review in 1985.

The extent of the review procedures necessary for
the Committee to satisfy itself concerning the
implications of a case for a firm's quality controls or
for professional standards varies case by case. SIC
task forces met with the engagement partners or the
partners that performed a concurring review of the
audit in litigation in 19 instances. In the other meet
ings, national office personnel familiar with the
case represented the firm. The nature of matters
discussed by firm representatives and task forces
included but was not limited to:
■ The firm's general views on the allegations and its
basis for such views.
■ The current responsibilities of the engagement
management team and concurring partner and
whether any of their responsibilities had been
changed since the litigation was filed.
■ The nature and timing of consultation that
occurred during the performance of the engage
ment, if any, on the matters that were the subject
of litigation.
■ The current policies and procedures of the firm
relative to matters that were the subject of the
litigation, including technical accounting and
auditing guidance materials relating to the
industry.
■ The results of recent peer reviews and inspections
of the offices and engagement supervisory person
nel involved in the litigation.
■ Issues highlighted in recent peer review reports
which appeared to be relevant to the allegations
in the litigation.
Task forces generally requested and received from
firms copies of relevant sections of their quality
control policies and procedures and accounting and
auditing guidance materials. In some cases, firms
chose to provide documentation relevant to specific
allegations to the task force even though they were
not, at the time, expected to do so as a condition of
SECPS membership.
The findings of the peer review of another firm,
which was being monitored by the SIC, resulted in
that firm installing special review procedures on all
audits supervised by a partner involved in an alleg
edly faulty audit. The Committee closed its file on
this case after obtaining assurance that the special
monitoring procedures would be implemented
effectively.
The accompanying chart indicates the depth of
inquiry performed by task forces for the 50 cases
closed by the Committee during the year.

Corrective Actions by Firms
As implied in the "Special Reviews" section, it is
common for a firm which has been sued for an
alleged audit failure to conduct a special internal
review. Procedures in such internal review include:
■ A thorough review of the engagement in question.
■ A review of other engagements performed by the
engagement supervisory team and the concurring
reviewer.

■ A review of internal firm guidance materials
relating to the issues raised in the litigation.
Some internal reviews performed in 1986 were
much broader in scope and encompassed a review of
the structure, organization, and operations of the
office in question, including how it assigns and
promotes personnel and whether specified quality
control policies were being complied with.
Such reviews provide the firm with a reevaluation
of its performance on the engagement in question,
another evaluation of the quality of work performed
by personnel involved in the engagement, and addi
tional evidence as to the effectiveness of firm-wide
policies and procedures. These reviews, like peer
reviews and the annual inspection program, reduce
the firm's potential for future audit failure.
The results of internal reviews are confidential.
However, except for the results of the review of the
engagement in question which are normally legally
privileged, SIC task forces have been given access to
the findings of internal reviews conducted by firms
when the SIC task forces have concluded that such
access is desirable. In such cases, the Committee is
thereby provided with documentation relevant to
the competence and performance of selected super
visory personnel, the effectiveness of the firm's
quality control policies and procedures, and the
adequacy of the firm's accounting and auditing guid
ance. Therefore, the need for special review by the
SIC is often, but not always, obviated.
Corrective actions taken by member firms during
1986-87, either on their own initiative or at the
insistence of the Committee, included:
■ Reassignment of responsibilities of certain firm
personnel.
■ Development and presentation of, or required
participation in, specified continuing professional
education programs.
■ Closer supervision of work performed by specified
individuals.
■ Development and distribution of internal guid
ance materials for audits of companies in special
ized industries.

Summary of SIC Activity
The SIC has two distinct responsibilities: (1) to
determine whether the allegations of audit failure
made against SECPS member firms indicate the
need for corrective measures by those firms and (2)
to determine whether an individual case (or several
cases) indicates a possible need for standard-setting
bodies to reconsider professional standards and
related guidance materials. The activities of the
Committee and the results obtained from such
activities are summarized in the accompanying
table.
In addition, the SIC referred two cases to the Pro
fessional Ethics Division for its review as to
whether the performance of the supervisory person
nel on the engagements was in accordance with
professional ethical standards.
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The audit process and the concomitant subject of
auditors' responsibility were the focus of study by
several groups, including the Section's Executive
Committee, the AICPA's Auditing Standards Board,
and the National Commission on Fraudulent Finan
cial Reporting, among others.
The Executive Committee concluded that more
effective communication between the auditor and
the audit committee is desirable. Accordingly, the
Executive Committee enacted a membership
requirement to enhance audit committee-auditor
communications. Member firms are now required
to communicate, at least annually, the following
matters to audit committees:
■ Material errors or irregularities that occurred and
were corrected in the period reported on and pos
sible illegal acts insofar as those matters may
bear on management integrity and the adequacy
of internal controls.
■ Material weaknesses in internal control which, if
not eliminated, reduce the likelihood that the
entity's control procedures would detect a mate
rial error or irregularity.
■ Opinions on GAAP and GAAS matters sought by
management from other auditors and the conclu
sions reached by management of the entity and
the auditor with respect to matters covered by
those opinions.
■ Disagreements with management on significant
accounting, auditing, and reporting matters
which, if not satisfactorily resolved, would have
resulted in qualification of the auditor's report.
■ Accounting and disclosure considerations associ
ated with significant contingencies presenting
especially difficult measurement problems and
which therefore are susceptible to subsequent
revision.
■ Accounting and disclosure considerations associ
ated with unusual transactions which may have
implications for assessing the quality of earnings.
■ Adoption by management of an accounting princi
ple if application of another applicable accounting
principle would have had a materially different
effect on the financials.
The Committee adopted this membership
requirement even though it was aware that the
Auditing Standards Board was considering incorpo
rating such a requirement as part of generally
accepted auditing standards and subsequently

issued an exposure draft of a statement on this
subject. Such action by the Section is n o t
unprecedented.
The Committee required member firms early in
1986 to establish policies and procedures concern
ing the expression of an opinion to nonaudit clients
on the application of generally accepted accounting
principles. It removed this requirement in Decem
ber 1986, after the Auditing Standards Board issued
an auditing standard delineating procedures all
audit firms must follow in such circumstances.
In September 1986, the Committee appointed the
Task Force on SIC Methodology and charged it with
reviewing the objectives and operations of the Spe
cial Investigations Committee and making recom
mendations to enhance its effectiveness and credi
bility. This action was taken primarily because (1)
SEC Chief Accountant Sampson had indicated that
the SEC did not have sufficient access to the SIC
process to permit the SEC to form an independent
judgment of its effectiveness, and (2) the POB had
urged that such a review be made and had proposed
a more structured approach to be used by the SIC in
its evaluations of the quality control implications of
allegations of substandard audit performance.
The Committee accepted the task force's report at
a special meeting in April 1987. The task force con
cluded that the mission of the SIC should not be
changed; its primary objective should continue to
be to complement the peer review process by evalu
ating the quality control implications of alleged
audit failures. The Executive Committee approved
and adopted five of the six recommendations
advanced by the task force. The recommendations
that were adopted, in summary, are:
■ The SIC should adopt a more structured approach
in evaluating and acting on reported cases.
■ Provision is made for SIC task forces to access,
when appropriate, selected documentation pre
pared in the course of performing the audit
engagement in question.
■ The SEC is to be provided more meaningful
reports of the actions and findings of the SIC on
reported cases.
■ SIC representatives should meet periodically with
the SEC Chief Accountant and members of his
staff.
The Executive Committee considered a report
published by the Public Oversight Board, "Public
Perceptions of Management Advisory Services Per
formed by CPA Firms for Audit Clients," which
reported the results of a survey conducted for the
Board by Audits & Surveys, Inc. In light of the pub
lic perception about CPA firms performing certain
types of MAS for audit clients, the Executive Com
mittee directed its Planning Subcommittee to moni
tor carefully developments regarding the perfor
mance of MAS.

Appendix D

the year by 14, and the number of firms in the Pri
vate Companies Practice Section increased by 155.
Details are shown in Tables 1 and 2.

Membership Data
and
Requirements

Membership Requirements

One thousand seven hundred and ten firms are
members of the Division for CPA Firms: 385 belong
to both the SEC Practice Section and the Private
Companies Practice Section, 10 belong only to the
SEC Practice Section, and 1,315 belong only to the
Private Companies Practice Section.
Membership in the Division increased steadily
throughout the year. After considering adjustment
for mergers between member firms, the number of
firms in the SEC Practice Section increased during

A firm that voluntarily joins the SEC Practice
Section agrees to abide by the Section's stringent
membership requirements which include, among
others:
■ Undergoing an independent triennial review of its
quality control system.
■ Rotating the partner-in-charge of each audit of an
SEC registrant at least every seven years.
■ Requiring review by a second partner, in addition
to the engagement partner, of the audit report,
financial statements, and selected workpapers of
the audit of each SEC registrant.

TABLE 1 Analysis of Membership in the Division for CPA Firms by Number of SEC Clients and by Section—
July 1, 1986 to June 30, 1987

Number of Firms

Firms with one or
m ore SEC clients
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S E C P S - o n l y .............
Both sections . . . .
P C P S - o n l y ................
Totals ...................

4
174
122
300

<1>
<6>
<5>
< 12>

—
<5>
<9>
< 14>

<1>
<9>

—

5
3
8

4
169
119
292

5
8
13

4
204
1 ,0 5 3
1,261

16
209
225

<6>
5
<1>

< 77 >

8
373
1 ,1 7 2
1 ,5 5 3

3
24
229
256

1
3
<4>
—

<2>
< 15>
<82>
<99>

—

3
8
20
31

1
9
<9>
1

7
175
116
298

Firms with no
SEC clients
S E C P S - o n l y .............
Both sections . . . .
P C P S - o n l y ................
Totals ...................

4
209
1,061
1 ,2 7 4

—

—

—

5
9
14

< 87>

3
210
1 ,1 9 9
1 ,4 1 2

All firms
S E C P S - o n l y .............
Both sections . . . .
P C P S - o n l y ................
Totals ...................

8
383
1 ,183
1 ,5 7 4

—

10
11
21

—
—
—
—

10
385
1,315
1 ,7 1 0

* All 10 firms that were members of both sections merged with other firms that are members of both sections. Of the 11 PCPS-only firms that
merged, 9 merged with firms that are members of both sections and 2 merged with other PCPS-only members.

TABLE 2 Analysis of Membership in the Division for CPA Firms—July 1, 1986 to June 30, 1987
Division for CPA Firms
July 1, 1986
No. of f i r m s ..............................
No. of SEC audit clients

..

No. of practice u n i t s ...........
No. of professionals

...........

1 ,5 5 3 *
1 3 ,3 2 6

June 30, 1987
1 ,7 1 0
1 4 ,3 5 7

3 ,7 3 1

3 ,863

1 1 3 ,5 5 1

1 1 8 ,0 9 7

* Restated for mergers between member firms July 1, 1986 to June 30, 1987.

SEC Practice Section
Increase
157
1,031
132
4,5 4 6

July 1, 1986
381*
1 3 ,1 1 8

June 30, 1987
395
1 4 ,1 5 5

2,019

1 ,9 4 6

9 7 ,1 8 0

9 9 ,8 4 7

Increase

< Decrease >
14
1,037
<73>
2 ,6 6 7

Analysis of Auditors of Publicly-traded Companies Listed in the Sixteenth Edition of Who Audits America *

Audited by Members of the Division for CPA Firms

7,168 companies (89.3%) with
combined sales of $3,423,947,000,000 (99.7%)

1,387 companies (99.9%)
with combined sales of
$2,896,742,000,000 (99.96%)
5,139 companies (85.9%)
with combined sales of
$426,133,000,000 (98.5%)
642 companies (97.7%)
with combined sales o f
$101,072,000,000 (98.8%)
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□
□
□

Companies whose stocks
are listed on
New York Stock Exchange

Audited by U.S. CPA Firms that are not members
of the Division for CPA Firms

861 companies (10.7%)
with combined sales
of $9,027,000,000 (0.3%)

Companies whose stocks
are listed on
American Stock Exchange
Companies whose stocks
are traded
Over-the-counter

844 companies (14.1 %)
-with combined sales of
$6,597,000,000 (1.5%)
15 companies (2.3%)
-with combined sales of
$1,241,000,000 (1.2%)
2 companies (0.1
with combined sales of
$1,189,000,000 (0.04%)

Analysis limited to companies whose stocks are actively traded and for whom Who Audits America reports financial
information for 1984 or later.

■ Reporting specified information to audit commit
tees of SEC clients.
■ Reporting litigation alleging failure to conduct an
audit of an SEC registrant in accordance with
professional standards.
■ Refraining from providing specified consulting
services to SEC audit clients.
■ Requiring all professionals in the firm to take
part in prescribed levels of qualifying continuing
professional education.

Auditors of Publicly-traded Companies
Firms that are members of the Division serve as

auditors for the overwhelming majority of compa
nies whose stocks are publicly-traded.
An analysis prepared by the Public Oversight
Board of companies listed in the sixteenth edition
of W ho A udits A m erica and for whom Who A udits
A m erica had financial statements dated 1984 or
later reveals that 89.3% of the companies are
audited by member firms and that the sales of those
companies account for over 99% of the aggregate
sales volume of all publicly-traded companies. The
majority of these companies are audited by firms
that belong to the SEC Practice Section. All but two
companies whose stocks are listed on the New York
Stock Exchange are audited by members of the SEC

Practice Section, and all but 15 companies whose
stocks are listed on the American Stock Exchange
are audited by members of the Division. Details are
shown in the accompanying chart.

MAS Engagements for SEC Audit Clients
Member firms are required to report certain infor
mation regarding fees received for management
advisory services engagements, including MAS fees

received from SEC registrants for whom the firm
also serves as auditor. Such information is reported
in the firm's annual report to the AICPA which is
placed in a public file. Analysis of the data reveals
that in 1986 member firms performed no MAS
engagements for 79.8% of their SEC registrant audit
clients and that MAS fees were greater than audit
fees in less than 1% of the cases. Details are shown
in Table 3.

TABLE 3 Analysis of Ratio of MAS Fees to Audit Fees Received from SEC Registrants
Number of Firms
Classified by Number
of SEC Clients

Firms (12) with 100 or
more SEC audit clients ..
Firms (11) with 20 to 99
SEC audit clients............
Firms (159) with fewer
than 20 SEC audit clients
Totals ............................
Percents ........................

Number of SEC Audit Clients Classified by Percent of MAS Fee to Audit Fee
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------0%
1-25%
26-50%
51-100%
over 100%
Total

10,567

2,094

254

199

114

13,228

393

35

5

5

4

442

345
11,305
79.8%

130
2,259
16.0%

8
267
1.9%

4
208
1.5%

0
118
0.8%

487
14,157
100.0%
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